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 INTRODUCTION 
Enron.  Worldcom.  Adelphia.  Global Crossing.  Tyco.  
Corporate scandals have made the front pages.  Congress has gotten 
in the act.  Members have held numerous hearings, given speeches, 
and, ultimately, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.1  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been busy writing regulations and 
leaning on the stock exchanges to modify their listing requirements, 
all in order to restore “investor confidence.”  Federal prosecutors have 
indicted executives of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia and their 
minions in the auditing and investment banking industries.2  State 
officials have also been active.  Several states have passed statutes 
that resemble or go beyond the strictures of Sarbanes-Oxley.3  Robert 
Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, has indicted the CEO 
and other officers of Tyco.4  And New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer has vastly increased his political standing by taking on the 
brokerage houses, perhaps following in the footsteps of Rudolf 
Giuliani, another renowned prosecutor of corporate criminals.5  The 
leaders of corporate America have been galvanized to action, forming 
committees and task forces, issuing reports, and giving speeches. 
But where has Delaware been through all this?  No bills have 
been introduced in Delaware’s legislature; no hearings held by its 
committees; its law enforcement agents have taken no action; and its 
executives have stayed mum.  How is it that Delaware—the home of 
what has long been viewed as the de facto national corporate law—has 
sat on the sidelines? 
 
 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et 
seq. (2005)). 
 2. Editorial, “Perp Walks” and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, USA TODAY, July 
9, 2004, at 10A. 
 3. Deborah Solomon, Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 
2003, at A4 (noting that at least 20 states have passed or are considering their own version of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and that some of the laws are tougher than the federal regulations); Laura 
Mahoney, New Laws Target Corporate Accountability, Conform Calif. Penalties to Sarbanes-
Oxley, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1608 (Sept. 29, 2003) (describing new California law); 
Carolyn Whetzel, Governor Signs Bill to Tighten Corporate Accounting Practices, 34 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) 1446 (Sept. 2, 2002) (describing California measures going beyond those of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 4. See News Release, District Attorney-New York County, Sept. 12, 2002, http://www. 
manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2002-09-12.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (announcing 
indictment of Tyco’s former CEO, CFO, and Chief Corporate Counsel). 
 5. See, e.g., David Teather, Attorney General Spitzer to Run for New York Governor, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2004, at 18 (“Eliot Spitzer, the campaigning New York attorney general who 
has made his name battling corruption on Wall Street, yesterday announced plans to run for 
state governor.  Mr. Spitzer has risen to prominence by exposing some of the worst practices that 
took hold among investment banks during the dotcom boom of the late 1990s.”). 
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In this Article, we take a step back from the recent scandals 
and the responses they have generated and ask some logically prior 
questions.  What is the structure of corporate lawmaking in the 
United States?  What is the relation between federal and state 
corporate lawmaking?6  And how does that relationship shape the 
style and content of corporate law? 
The relationship between federal lawmaking power and state—
in particular Delaware—corporate law has become the focus of 
significant scholarly attention.  In a recent article, Mark Roe has 
argued that, because of the possibility of federal intervention, most 
Delaware corporate law rules either mimic the rules favored by 
federal lawmakers or get preempted by federal law.7  In Roe’s world, 
states, and in particular Delaware, are basically federal 
implementation agents who enjoy little autonomy.  Roe views the 
federal enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the ultimate proof of 
his thesis, with the federal authorities “[d]ropping [p]retense” and 
“squelching the states with [their] own substantive law.”8 
Responding to Roe in an article contemporaneous to ours, 
Roberta Romano argues that states compete largely unimpeded by 
federal threats because states correlatively exercise control over 
Congress.9  According to Romano, the key components of state 
corporate law—fiduciary duties and the allocation of authority 
between managers and shareholders—have not been changed by 
federal law.10  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is, at most, a fairly narrow 
exception as it arguably alters the allocation of authority only in its 
audit committee provisions.11 
The articles by Roe and Romano represent the latest chapter of 
the classic state-competition debate in corporate law, where some 
scholars posit that federal regulation is needed to prevent a race to the 
bottom,12 while others maintain that federal intervention is 
 
 6. The literature on this question is expanding. Important recent contributions include: 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26; 
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Robert B. Thompson, 
Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 99 (2003); and Robert B. Thompson & 
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 859 (2003). 
 7. See Roe, supra note 6, at 591–92. 
 8. Id. at 632–33. 
 9. Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate 
Governance? 39–40 (Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. For Fin., Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=693484. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 34. 
 12. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1992) (arguing that, in 
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undesirable and existing federal rules should be repealed in order not 
to impede a race to the top.13  Roe’s thesis implies that the whole 
debate is misconceived because the federal authorities call all the 
shots.  Romano contends that state competition, and the concomitant 
race to the top, is alive and well even after Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Our position differs both from Roe’s and Romano’s. We argue 
that the possibility of federal preemption constitutes a threat to 
Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times—such as during 
the recent corporate scandals—when systemic change is seen as 
generating a significant populist payoff. Sarbanes-Oxley is neither the 
death knell for state competition, as Roe suggests, nor an aberration, 
as Romano argues, but a response to a particular political climate that 
constitutes a threat to Delaware’s highly-profitable chartering 
business.  
We further suggest that Delaware has adapted to this threat 
by pursuing what we will call a classical or 19th century common law 
model of lawmaking.  But this classical model of lawmaking entails 
some intrinsic limitations, including that legal change is slow, 
standard-based, and incremental.  These limitations explain how 
Delaware responded to the recent corporate scandals and, in turn, 
create a space where the relationship between federal rules and 
Delaware law is symbiotic, rather than competitive as depicted by the 
classical state-competition debate. Our thesis thus seeks to explain 
the structure of Delaware corporate law and to offer a proper domain 
for federal law even for commentators broadly sympathetic to the 
race-to-the-top view. 
In Part I, we analyze the institutional and political landscape 
of corporate lawmaking.  Although Delaware exercises a significant 
lawmaking role, it is faced with an omnipresent specter of a federal 
takeover, which could threaten the substantial income the state 
derives from franchise fees.  The principal threat for Delaware is the 
possibility that federal intervention will be triggered by a situation in 
which systemic change generates significant populist political payoffs.  
This danger is aggravated by Delaware’s apparent lack of democratic 
legitimacy: why should a small state set national policy for corporate 
 
certain areas, state competition leads to rules biased towards managerial interests); William L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–66 
(1974) (arguing that state competition results in a race to the bottom). 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982) (postulating 
that Delaware has attracted corporations because its laws maximize shareholder value); see 
generally Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (calling for repealing much of federal securities regulation and 
replacing it with state law). 
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law?  It is in Delaware’s interest to structure its law to minimize its 
exposure to such an attack.  In addition, Delaware must take account 
of the rules on personal jurisdiction and on conflict of laws embedded 
in the federal structure. 
Part II identifies a number of salient traits that characterize 
Delaware’s corporate law.  Most important and controversial legal 
rules are the product of judge-made law.  Judicial opinions are filled 
with quasi-deterministic reasoning.  Statutory amendments to the 
corporation law are initially drafted by a bar committee, are adopted 
without change or debate by the legislature, and address largely 
technical and noncontroversial matters.  Delaware’s judiciary has 
substantial expertise on corporate law and is nonpolitical.  In contrast 
to Delaware’s first-rate system for the private enforcement of 
corporate laws, public enforcement is virtually nonexistent.  And the 
scope of corporate law is largely confined to the regulation of the 
internal affairs of a corporation. 
In Part III, we argue that these traits can be understood as 
adaptations to the political and institutional landscape in which 
Delaware operates. In many respects, Delaware’s corporate law may 
be the last vestige of the classical 19th century common law model in 
America: most important legal rules are promulgated by a 
nonpartisan, expert judiciary; these rules are presented as derived 
from long-standing and widely accepted principles; the law is enforced 
through civil litigation brought by private parties; and even legislative 
amendments generate neither debate nor controversy.  All this has the 
effect of creating and enhancing a technocratic, apolitical gloss over 
Delaware’s corporate law and thus helps to shield Delaware from 
being attacked for lacking democratic legitimacy.  At the same time, 
the scope of Delaware’s corporate law is designed to minimize conflicts 
by assuring that Delaware has the requisite personal jurisdiction over 
defendants to enforce its law effectively and that the prevailing 
conflict rules point to substantive Delaware law as applicable to a 
dispute. 
In Part IV, we assess Delaware’s response to the recent 
corporate scandals and the division of corporate lawmaking roles 
between Delaware and the federal government.  We argue that 
Delaware’s response to the scandals—or rather, the lack thereof—
flows from its adherence to the classical common law model.  Faced 
with corporate scandals, calls for action, and Sturm und Drang, 
Congress passed sweeping legislation and Eliot Spitzer crusaded 
against Wall Street.  But Delaware waits until a legal dispute is 
brought in its courts, and even then addresses the issues only in an 
incremental fashion.  While this means that Delaware has been out of 
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the limelight, potentially hurting its image in the short term, staying 
out of the political limelight is in Delaware’s long-term interest.  
Spitzer may be a successful politician, and he may even be the right 
Attorney General for New York, but he would not be the best person to 
assure that hundreds of millions in annual franchise fees keep flowing 
into Delaware’s coffers.  But because the classical common law style, 
together with jurisdictional and conflict rules, constrain Delaware, 
federal law is needed to complement Delaware’s.  This is so where 
Delaware’s common law regime cannot effectively supply the optimal 
legal regime—e.g., because it requires public enforcement or is highly 
regulatory—or where the rules on personal jurisdiction or conflicts 
inhibit Delaware’s ability to regulate.  In that respect, the relation 
between federal law and Delaware law is symbiotic, rather than 
competitive: Delaware is happy to have federal law pick up the slack 
and thereby reduce the likelihood that ineffective regulation produces 
a populist backlash. 
I.  THE LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE LAWMAKING 
In this Part, we examine the division of corporate lawmaking 
between federal and state authorities.  We provide a stylized 
description of two related landscapes of corporate lawmaking—the 
institutional and the political—and analyze the powers of and 
constraints placed on lawmaking by federal actors and by Delaware. 
A.   The Institutions of Corporate Lawmaking 
Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the allocation of 
corporate lawmaking authority in the United States.  Congress sits at 
the top of the chart.  There is little constitutional doubt that, if 
Congress wished to enact a national corporate law that would displace 
all state corporate law, it could do so pursuant to its power under the 
Commerce Clause.14 
 
 14. See Roe, supra note 6, at 607–20 (discussing topics where federal rules have displaced 
state rules). 
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Given this authority, Congress faces several options.  It can 
legislate corporate law directly, enacting either a comprehensive 
corporate law or discrete elements.  It can set relatively broad 
standards and then establish an administrative agency, such as the 
SEC, with subsidiary lawmaking powers.  It can set broad standards 
and leave it to courts to adjudicate cases and develop the law through 
a common law process. It can enact enabling provisions which leave 
the task of making specific rules to the domain of private choice.  Or it 
can do nothing and thereby leave the regulation of corporate conduct 
to the states. 
If Congress is willing to allow the states to act, the states then 
face similar options: to legislate directly; to establish an 
administrative agency; to let courts develop rules through the common 
law process; or to enact enabling provisions.  In addition, states must 
determine the applicable “choice of law” rules: should the applicable 
law be the law of the corporation’s state of incorporation; should it be 
the law of its principal place of business; or should a forum state apply 
its own law even if the corporation’s ties to the state are more 
tenuous?15 
Abstracting for the moment from public choice concerns (to be 
covered in the next Section), a public-regarding legislature would need 
to consider a variety of factors in deciding how best to legislate in the 
corporate area.  First, there is the question of institutional 
competence.  Promulgating detailed fine-grained rules requires a 
certain level of institutional infrastructure that an administrative 
agency, like the SEC, may possess, but that a legislature is likely to 
lack.  Second, there is the question of the appropriate degree of 
decentralization. Is a uniform national rule optimal?  Is it better to 
allow for diversity among the states?  To what extent should 
companies be permitted to set their own rules? 
But Figure 1 only provides part of the picture.  For people who 
focus on corporate law, a picture of corporate lawmaking that puts 
Congress at the top and the Delaware courts, as a subset of other state 
courts, toward the bottom fails to capture who the important corporate 
law actors are.  
If one focuses not on lawmaking power but on lawmaking role, 
a different picture emerges.  Consider, in this regard, Figure 2.   
 
 15. State legislatures’ freedom of action in this regard may be subject to some constitutional 
constraints. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645–46 (1982) (holding that Illinois’ 
antitakeover statute that applied to companies with tenuous contacts to the state violated the 
Commerce Clause). 
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Figure 2 recognizes that courts, in the process of resolving disputes, 
often have the first opportunity to address problems through 
lawmaking.  As Hart and Sacks pointed out: 
In the development of Anglo-American legal systems, courts have functioned 
characteristically as the place of initial resort for the settlement of problems which have 
failed of private solution. 
. . . [T]he body of decisional law announced by the courts in the disposition of these 
problems tends always to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law 
governing the society.  Legislatures and administrative agencies tend always to make 
law by way not of original solution of social problems, but by alteration of the solutions 
first laid down by the courts.16 
Hart and Sacks’s notion of courts as first-line lawmakers 
provides an important modification of the picture of lawmaking 
authority in Figure 1.  In the first instance, a myriad of corporate law 
disputes are brought to the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Other 
corporate law disputes are brought to the federal courts or the courts 
of other states.17 In resolving these disputes, courts will often be the 
first body to address a problem though lawmaking. 
Consider Figure 2 in more detail.  Controversies arise among 
corporations, managers, and investors; and between corporations and 
employees, regulators, citizens and others.  When these controversies 
become legal disputes, they can go either to the Delaware courts, other 
state courts, or the federal system.  Which forum parties resort to for 
litigating their disputes, in turn, is influenced and sometimes 
determined by two additional elements peculiar to the U.S. federal 
system.  The first element concerns personal jurisdiction.  Under the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert 
jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite minimum 
contacts with the forum state.  The second element concerns the rules 
on conflict of laws.  These rules, which are part of the law of each 
state, determine which jurisdiction’s law applies to a dispute.  Under 
the prevailing conflict of laws rules, the law of the state of 
incorporation typically governs the internal affairs of the 
corporation.18  With respect to other issues, however, these rules will 
rarely point to the law of the state of incorporation as governing a 
dispute. 
But, as shown in Figure 2, public controversies will 
occasionally avoid the legal machinery entirely.  Instead, such 
 
 16. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163–64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994). 
 17. E.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 303–310 (1971). 
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controversies are brought to the SEC or directly to either the state 
legislature or to the U.S. Congress.  Moreover, once a legal dispute has 
been adjudicated by the courts, parties19 interested in the legal rule 
promulgated face a decision whether to accept the result or to seek to 
have it changed.  For disputes adjudicated within the Delaware 
system, the choices are to turn to the Delaware legislature,20 to go to 
the SEC,21 or to lobby Congress.22  Similarly, parties dissatisfied with 
the legal rules emerging from federal court adjudications can turn 
either directly to Congress or to the SEC.23 
While, as depicted in Figure 1, members of the Delaware 
judiciary may appear to be little more than secondary actors, Figure 2 
indicates that Delaware judges can have a critical role.24  Whether 
they do or not depends on where disputes are litigated and how often 
the Delaware legislature or federal lawmakers intervene.  As 
discussed in Part II, Delaware courts adjudicate, in the first instance, 
most corporate law disputes involving public corporations that raise 
issues addressed by state law,25 and the Delaware legislature rarely 
intervenes.  As discussed in Part III, this manner of lawmaking serves 
to fend off federal intervention. 
B.   The Politics of Federal Intervention 
Figures 1 and 2 also provide a starting point for understanding 
the politics of federal intervention in corporate lawmaking.  Generally, 
Delaware exercises the first-line rulemaking role for much of 
 
 19. By parties, we mean interest groups and political actors that have a stake in the legal 
rule announced in a case, rather than the specific parties to the litigation. 
 20. An example of this is the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) in the wake of Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). 
 21. An example here is the SEC’s reversal of the discriminatory self-tender defense 
sanctioned generally in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See 
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1010 (5th ed. 1998). 
 22. An example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition of all loans to executives. See 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 86–
89, 150–53 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 52/2004, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=596101. 
 23. See infra Part II.A, especially note 90 (detailing several instances where rules on insider 
trading announced by federal courts have been reversed by Congress or the SEC). Since federal 
courts sometimes also interpret state law, some federal court rulings can also be reversed by 
state legislatures. 
 24. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–75 (1986) (Hercules, the judge, in a theory of 
“law as integrity”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–30 (1977) (Hercules, the 
judge, deciding cases on principle rather than policy). 
 25. For a contrary view, see Thompson & Sale, supra note 6, at 860–61 (arguing that 
corporate governance is regulated primarily through federal securities law and shareholder 
litigation). 
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corporate law, mostly because Delaware courts are in the forefront of 
resolving corporate disputes. A significant prospect of change can arise 
only if a significant interest group is highly dissatisfied or if political 
actors foresee political benefit from advocating legal change.  Even 
when there is a prospect for such change, however, there are forces 
pushing back.26 
Consider the possibility of congressional intervention.27 
Suppose that some politicians become convinced that interstate 
competition for corporate charters results in a race to the bottom;28 or 
they favor a federal takeover of state corporate law for more naked 
 
 26. Our view of the threat of federal intervention thus differs from Mark Roe’s recent 
insightful analysis of the issue. Roe regards the federal authorities as having some independent 
substantive policy preferences. In order not to trigger federal intervention, state rules must 
match or come close to these preferences. See Roe, supra note 6, at 607. As discussed in this 
Section, we see federal intervention as a product of either interest-group lobbying (where interest 
groups have both preferences for the actual content of legal rules and the identity of the 
regulator) or populist politics and regard the latter as the more serious threat. 
 27. Piecemeal reform can also come from the SEC, with a somewhat different sort of 
political dynamic. See, e.g., Editorial, Headline Risk at the SEC, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2004, at 
A16 [hereinafter Headline Risk at the SEC] (accusing the SEC of adopting cumbersome 
regulations on mutual fund trading for their headline value); Mark Maremont & Deborah 
Solomon, Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 
2003, at A1 (describing various reasons for the SEC’s cautious approach to regulation). 
Historically, there have been a variety of more or less pervasive SEC incursions into the 
traditional topics of Delaware corporate law. The more confined incursions include rules 
governing going private transactions, tender offers, and dual-class recapitalizations. The more 
pervasive ones include the proxy rules that govern shareholder voting and insider trading rules. 
Without delving deeply into the politics of agency rulemaking, one can note that the SEC is 
subject to many of the same pressures as Congress, and that, when the key constituencies are 
satisfied with the status quo, SEC attempts to expand its reach can usually be resisted. 
Additionally, the SEC can only act to the extent Congress has delegated the requisite authority, 
and can be overridden by Congress or the courts if it steps out of line. See Bus. Roundtable v. 
SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC overstepped its statutory 
authority by controlling the allocation of substantive powers among classes of shareholders).  
 Stock exchanges also have the ability to act, either on their own behest or because of SEC 
pressure. While the exchanges have wider latitude to make corporate law rules than the SEC 
does, they are constrained by their desire to attract listings, and competition from other 
exchanges. They may thus be reluctant to adopt rules opposed by managers who exercise control 
over where companies are listed (more so than over where they are incorporated). More 
fundamentally, exchanges lack enforcement powers. The most serious sanction—delisting—is 
hardly credible when there are competing exchanges, and, moreover, hardly a consolation for 
shareholders who are supposedly helped by the rules. For this reason, only clear-cut rules by the 
exchanges that create no ex-post ambiguities have real bite (if a violation is obvious, most 
companies will not dare to do it, even if enforcement is weak). See generally Edward Rock, 
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 697–700 (2002) (discussing stock exchanges’ difficulties in enforcing 
their listing agreement when firms can easily list on competing exchanges). 
 28. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1441 (enumerating areas in which federal 
regulation should be expanded); Cary, supra note 12, at 705 (asserting that “[t]he absurdity of 
this race for the bottom . . . should arrest the conscience of the American bar”). 
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political considerations.  How might parties favoring the status quo 
resist such a move? 
They might make a constitutional argument: namely, that such 
a wholesale displacement of state corporate law would be beyond 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. As a matter of 
contemporary constitutional law, this is a weak—indeed, nearly 
laughable—argument.29  In light of Congress’s constitutional ability to 
intercede directly and to shift corporate lawmaking authority among 
the various players, the “internal affairs” doctrine—according to which 
the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the 
 
 29. There is no plausible constitutional argument that Congress would not have the power, 
under the Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a national corporate law. 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the Commerce Clause) grants Congress the power to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the Several States.” This has been 
expansively interpreted. For good, comprehensive discussions, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3 (2d ed. 2002); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW §§ 5-4, 5-5 (3d ed. 2000). From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court did not hold a single 
congressional action to be beyond the regulatory power conferred by the Commerce Clause. Id. 
During this period, for example, the Supreme Court held that Congress had Commerce Clause 
power to regulate stock in public utilities, Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 96 (1946), 
and to regulate interstate insurance transactions, United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 
U.S. 533, 553 (1944). Indeed, the Commerce Clause is the sole jurisdictional basis for federal 
securities regulation. 
 In a line of cases beginning in 1995, the Supreme Court indicated that there exist limits to 
Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 
549, 551 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000) (holding the civil damages provision in the Violence 
Against Women Act unconstitutional). See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 
(2000) (interpreting federal law narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts whether Congress had 
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause with regard to arson); Solid Waste Agency of No. 
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001) (same with regard 
to migratory birds); Chemerinsky, supra this note, § 3-3.5. But this line of cases focuses entirely 
on the extent to which Congress can regulate noncommercial or noneconomic activity under the 
Commerce Clause. There is no suggestion in the opinions or in subsequent case law that the 
judicial skepticism would extend to indisputably commercial activity such as securities 
regulation or corporate governance. 
 The only genuine Commerce Clause issue that has recently arisen in corporate and securities 
law is the extent to which the Supremacy Clause or the (dormant) Commerce Clause preempt or 
preclude state regulation of takeovers. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982) 
(holding that Illinois’ state takeover statute unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of 
the Commerce Clause); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding 
that Indiana’s statute regulating the acquisition of control shares in public corporations did not 
violate the Commerce Clause).  In CTS, in which the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s control 
share acquisition statute, the Court held that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause, 
as it did not discriminate against interstate commerce, 481 U.S. at 89–98, nor subject 
corporations to inconsistent standards, id. at 88–89. Neither case raises any question as to 
Congress’s power to preempt state corporate law in the area of tender offers; only about whether 
Congress in fact intended to do so and, in the case of CTS, whether, in the absence of any such 
intent, the Commerce Clause otherwise precluded the states from acting. Indeed, neither case 
makes any sense without an assumption that Congress could choose to regulate takeovers 
nationally. 
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state of incorporation—is better thought of as a contingent allocation 
of responsibility based on prudential considerations, and not any sort 
of iron dictate. 
But even if a frontal constitutional attack is weak, the 
underlying themes of “corporate federalism” or “cooperative 
federalism”30 and states’ rights have significant political and legal 
salience.  It could, in other words, be an effective policy argument in 
the halls of Congress or the offices of the SEC.31  It could also 
influence courts when they interpret ambiguous federal legislation.32 
But, of course, the course of legislation is only partially 
determined by such policy and legal arguments.  Interest groups 
matter too.  Figures 1 and 2 provide a useful guide to those actors with 
sufficiently large interests to get involved politically.  The constituents 
with an interest in corporate law are primarily managers and 
investors, with several other groups, such as lawyers and employees, 
taking a secondary interest in corporate law rules.  To the extent that 
managers are opposed to a change in the law, organizations such as 
the Business Roundtable would lobby against it.  To the extent that 
institutional investors are opposed, one would expect them to lobby as 
well.  Moreover, Delaware is itself interested in limiting federal 
intrusions into corporate law, and Delaware’s interests are 
influentially represented.  For example, during the 107th Congress, 
when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, both Delaware senators 
were on committees that considered the bill: Joseph Biden on the 
Judiciary Committee and Thomas Carper on the Banking, Housing & 
Urban Affairs Committee.33 
 
 30. While one might speak of a “corporate law federalism,” it is more (descriptively) 
accurate to think of the distribution of corporate lawmaking as “decentralization.” See Edward L. 
Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.  903, 
910–14, 950-951 (1994) (arguing that federalism is better understood as managerial 
decentralization). Whatever the general persuasiveness of Rubin and Feeley’s view, in corporate 
law it is accurate: the extent of Congress’s power under the Constitution to legislate in the 
corporate area is such that “our corporate law federalism” is a matter of an implicit or explicit 
decentralization driven by bureaucratic, political and legal process factors, as we discuss in 
greater detail in the text. 
 31. See Letter from Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, Delaware Supreme Court, to Alan 
Beller, Director of Division of Corporate Finance, SEC (Mar. 11, 2004) (expressing reservations 
about the proposed SEC rule on shareholder nominations because it “intrudes upon and may be 
in conflict with corporate internal affairs that are the province of state law.”) (on file with 
authors). 
 32. The U.S. Supreme Court has been solicitous of states’ primacy in corporate law. See, 
e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 91; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (refusing to 
broaden Rule 10b-5 to cover merger transactions such that “established state policies of 
corporate regulation would be overridden”). 
 33. [2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index (CCH) 11,501-02 (Aug. 23, 2002). 
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Finally, the Constitution and internal congressional rules 
make it easier to stop legislation than to enact it.  To pass a law, 
legislation must ordinarily be approved by congressional committees; 
be put on the agenda by the congressional leadership; be approved by 
majorities in both houses of Congress; either not be filibustered or be 
favored by a supermajority of the Senate; and either be approved by 
the President or favored by veto-proof majorities in both houses.  As a 
result, a determined minority of legislators can often block legislation 
favored by a majority. 
To be sure, even with this built-in status quo bias, Delaware 
must keep the principal organized interest groups affected by 
Delaware corporate law reasonably satisfied in order to avoid federal 
intervention.  For several reasons, however, we do not regard federal 
intervention due to interest group pressure as a major threat for 
Delaware. 
First, “satisfied” in this context relates not only to the specific 
legal rules in force but more generally to a judgment of comparative 
institutional competence—namely, which lawmaking institution is 
likely to perform better over the long term.  Even if managers or 
investors are dissatisfied with a particular substantive rule of 
Delaware law, there are a number of plausible reasons why they may 
nevertheless not push for federal intervention.  They may, for 
instance, believe that they will carry more relative weight in Delaware 
than in any of the alternative federal institutions, perhaps because 
unions or SEC bureaucrats will be more influential at the federal 
level.  In addition, Delaware may be more responsive to new 
developments, have greater expertise in applying rules, or otherwise 
be able to devise rules that are superior to those likely to emerge from 
federal actors.  Moreover, it may be less costly to influence Delaware 
than Congress or the SEC.  And finally, a state system may be viewed 
as a less risky forum because, for example, it is less likely to generate 
radical legislation or because it affords greater opportunities to opt-
out of legislation (by changing corporate domiciles) than a monopolist 
federal regulator. 
Second, even when Congress has enacted legislation otherwise 
trampling on states’ rights, it has historically taken special care not to 
intrude upon Delaware.  For example, the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act,34 which in effect deprived state courts of 
jurisdiction over securities class actions for misrepresentations or 
deceit and eliminated the states’ ability to apply their own securities 
 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77(p) (1933)). Technically, the Act makes 
most securities class actions removable to federal court. Id. 
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laws on misrepresentations or deceit in class actions, contains the so-
called “Delaware carve-out.”35  The carve-out specifically exempts 
actions for misrepresentations based on the corporate law of a 
company’s state of incorporation.36  Similarly, the Class Action 
Fairness Act, designed to assure that most class actions with a 
national class of plaintiffs are adjudicated in federal court, specifically 
excludes corporate law class actions arising under the law of the 
company’s state of incorporation.37  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
Delaware’s Senator Carper was one of eight original sponsors (and one 
of a handful of Democratic supporters) of the Senate version of the 
Act.38  Thus, for one reason or another, Delaware’s corporate law 
seems to enjoy great respect on Capitol Hill. 
Most importantly, however, Delaware has strong incentives to 
keep investors and managers satisfied even apart from the possibility 
of federal intervention.  Investors and managers control incorporation 
decisions of companies when they go public and decisions of existing 
public companies to reincorporate.  As Delaware caters anyway to 
investors and managers in order to attract incorporations, keeping 
investors and managers sufficiently satisfied that they do not lobby for 
federal intervention should not require much additional effort or 
adjustment.39  Moreover, to the extent that particular investors and 
managers are dissatisfied, it is usually much easier for them to induce 
a particular firm to incorporate in a different state than to lobby for a 
change in federal law. 
A greater concern than federal intervention due to interest 
group pressure is the possibility that federal intervention will be 
triggered by a situation in which systemic change generates a 
significant populist political payoff (a payoff unrelated to interest 
 
 35. See, e.g., Spehar v. Fuchs, No. 02-9352CM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10406, at *25 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (noting that the Securities Act contains three exceptions known as the 
“Delaware carve-outs”). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (2005). 
 37. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4, 13 (2005) (to be codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2)). 
 38. Similarly, Senator Biden, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, probably 
influenced the committee’s decision not to eliminate state of incorporation as a venue for 
bankruptcy cases. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some 
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1998).  Although Delaware derives some benefits 
from being a venue in major bankruptcy cases, these benefits pale in comparison to those from 
being the domicile of most publicly traded companies. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The 
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 694–95 n.50 (2002). 
 39. To be sure, the relative power of investors and managers may differ from the 
incorporation and reincorporation contexts to the context of federal lobbying, thus providing 
some incentives for the groups that are more powerful in the lobbying context to seek federal 
intervention.  But the direction of that difference is unclear, unstable, hard to predict, and likely 
to be small. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 740–45. 
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group pressure).40  Such situations can arise in times of crisis or 
scandal or due to political entrepreneurship.41 
High-profile scandals can shift the balance of power both in 
Congress and, derivatively, at the SEC, by triggering a deep, populist 
theme in American politics and energizing broad, loosely organized 
constituencies.  The classic examples of large scale federal incursion 
into corporate law in response to crisis and scandal are the enactment 
of the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 
which created the SEC and, more recently, the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the changes in the stock exchange listing 
rules.  In both instances, we had major scandals that coincided with 
the bursting of a stock market bubble that left investors licking their 
wounds and looking for someone to blame.42  Congressional hearings 
were held and there was a feeling that “something must be done.”  
Congress felt pressure to act, and act it did.43 
The danger of a populist backlash against Delaware is 
aggravated by the lurking argument that Delaware lacks political 
legitimacy.  Why should a small state—a “pigmy,” as a leading 
proponent of a federal corporate law referred to it pejoratively44—have 
so significant a lawmaking role for national corporate law and derive 
huge profits in the process?  From the perspective of democratic 
theory, would it not make more sense if the members of Congress, 
elected by all U.S. citizens, made the law affecting corporations with 
national operations and shareholders?  It is against this background 
lack of democratic legitimacy that populist appeals for federal 
intervention will be made and resonate.45 
 
 40. For example, the press describes Eliot Spitzer’s actions as populist. See, e.g., John 
Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 
2003 at 54, 54 (“Spitzer was well placed to launch a populist crusade.”); Editorial, Spitzer’s 
Grandstand, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2004, at A14 (“New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
fancies himself a populist hero for assailing Wall Street misdeeds . . . .”). 
 41. For examples from the history of U.S. regulation of business, see MARK ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 26–45, 51–146 (1994). 
 42. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (noting that most new regulations follow stock market crashes). 
 43. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 22, at 146–74 (discussing how the Act is a product of 
political entrepreneurship, rather than interest-group lobbying); Headline Risk at the SEC, 
supra note 27 (accusing the SEC of adopting cumbersome mutual fund regulations for their 
headline value). 
 44. Cary, supra note 12, at 701. 
 45. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 12, at 698 (querying whether Delaware should lead in 
corporate law when it gives so much power to management); Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The 
Case Against Delaware, NEW  REPUBLIC, Aug. 19–26, 2002, at 20, 22–23 (crediting Delaware 
with “the national emasculation of corporate governance”); Triumph of the Pygmy State, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2003, at 55, 55–56 (questioning why the laws of a state with approximately 
0.3 percent of population governs more than half of public corporations). 
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Alas for Delaware, it can do nothing to deprive Congress of its 
power to enact corporate laws.  Likewise, it can do little to prevent 
crises, scandals, or the emergence of political entrepreneurs.  What 
Delaware can do, however, is structure its law in a manner adapted to 
preserve its scope and reduce the likelihood that it will become the 
target of systemic change. 
As we discuss in Part III, many traits of Delaware corporate 
law can be understood as adaptive to the institutional and political 
landscape in which Delaware, as the leading supplier of corporate law, 
must operate.  This landscape includes Delaware’s constitutional and 
political vulnerability to federal intervention and the strictures 
imposed by jurisdictional and conflict rules.  Our claim is not that 
Delaware purposefully adopted all these traits to serve its aims.  We 
do not believe that the connection is that direct.  Rather, the claim is 
that key patterns of Delaware corporate lawmaking are consistent 
with the Delaware actors being sensitive to their institutional role and 
its limitations.  Even if these patterns have not been purposefully 
adopted, the fact that they serve this function contributes to their 
survival. 
Finally, we will argue in Part IV that not every federal 
intervention into corporate law is against Delaware’s interest.  
Because of the political constraints placed on Delaware by its desire to 
avoid systemic change and because of the legal constraints imposed by 
jurisdictional and conflict rules, Delaware cannot effectively regulate 
certain types of misconduct.  In these areas, which include much of 
traditional securities regulation, Delaware should have no major 
problem with federal regulation.  To the contrary, Delaware may favor 
federal intervention to the extent that it makes the corporate law 
system as a whole less scandal prone and reduces the chances of a 
populist backlash against Delaware as a principal regulator.  Thus, 
the relationship between federal and state regulation in corporate law 
is, in our view, much more symbiotic than most commentators 
acknowledge.46 
II. SALIENT TRAITS OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW 
Delaware’s corporate law has a number of salient and 
characteristic traits.  These traits concern its style, the manner in 
which it is enforced, and its scope.  In this Part, we explore Delaware 
 
 46. Cf. Roe, supra note 6, at 592 (focusing on the role of federal regulation as Delaware’s 
competition); Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1441 (calling for federal intervention to preempt state 
law); Cary, supra note 12, at 701–03 (same); Romano, supra note 13, at 2361–62 (arguing that 
much of the federal securities regulation should be repealed and replaced with state law). 
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corporate law’s traits in six areas: the breadth of its judge-made law; 
its quasi-deterministic judge-made law; the making of its statutory 
law; its judiciary; its enforcement mechanism; and the overall scope of 
its corporate law.  As we will explain in the next Part, all these traits 
can be seen as adaptations to the peculiar landscape in which 
Delaware, a tiny state that is the leading supplier of corporate law, 
must operate. 
A. The Breadth of Judge-Made Law 
The most noteworthy trait of Delaware’s corporate law is the 
extent to which important and controversial legal rules are 
promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature.  
In Delaware, judge-made law, to the virtual exclusion of statutory law, 
governs fundamental issues such as fiduciary duties of directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders, the prerequisites for a 
derivative suit, and disclosure obligations.  Even powers that the 
Delaware code explicitly accords to the board of directors are subject 
to a judicially created and interpreted duty not to use these powers for 
“inequitable purposes.”47  Thus, judge-made, rather than statutory, 
law governs issues such as: 
 
• when directors are liable (the famous “business judgment” 
rule);48 
• what counts as a self-interested transaction;49 
• who is regarded as a controlling shareholder;50 
• the scope of a controlling shareholder’s obligations;51 
• the legal test to determine the validity of a self-interested-
transaction;52 
• when a director is considered “independent”;53 
 
 47. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (enjoining 
management from expediting the annual stockholders’ meeting to obstruct a proxy fight with 
dissident shareholders). 
 48. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(applying the business judgment rule from common law to find no director liability). 
 49. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002) (clarifying that, where self-
dealing is absent, a director is interested when a decision materially benefits or detrimentally 
impacts the director in a way not shared by the corporation or stockholders). 
 50. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Del. 1994) (finding 
that minority shareholder exercised actual control by dominating corporate affairs). 
 51. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (explaining when 
the intrinsic fairness applies to parent-subsidiary dealings). 
 52. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (establishing a legal 
standard for evaluating a transaction when company directors are on both sides). 
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• the legal effect of approval of a transaction by independent 
directors or by disinterested shareholders;54 
• what constitutes a “corporate opportunity”;55 
• the legal tests regulating takeover defenses;56 
• when a board can take actions that interfere with shareholder 
franchise;57 
• when a shareholder can institute a derivative suit without 
making a prior demand on the board;58 
• when shareholders lose their limited liability;59 
• limitations on charitable giving;60 and 
• the right of contestants to be reimbursed for expenses incurred 
in proxy contests.61 
 
Neither historic contingency nor the nature of the legal rules at 
issue fully explains this breadth of judge-made law.  To be sure, the 
law of fiduciary duties has historically been developed by the 
judiciary.  Nevertheless, Delaware’s judge-made law is distinctive in a 
number of ways.  First, Delaware, whose economic well-being depends 
on the franchise revenues it earns from public corporations, should be 
expected to pay significant attention to the way its law is generated.  
Other states, which do not derive significant economic benefits from 
chartering companies, may be affected by inertia and inattention with 
respect to the structure of their corporate law.  In Delaware, however, 
where franchise taxes account for almost 20 percent of the state 
 
 53. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (explaining that directors are 
independent when their decisions are based on the merits). 
 54. See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (shifting the burden of proof regarding fairness to the 
shareholder-plaintiff in these circumstances). 
 55. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) (defining 
“corporate opportunity” and explaining standards for when a director or officer may or may not 
take the opportunity). 
 56. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (requiring 
that “defensive measures must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed”). 
 57. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring 
“compelling justification” for such actions). 
 58. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818 (requiring pleading with particularity of facts 
alleging self-interest, lack of independence, or action contrary to corporation’s best interests). 
 59. See, e.g., Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Tex. Am. Energy Corp., No. 8578, 1988 Del. Ch. Lexis 
11, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 27, 1988) (listing instances when the court will pierce the veil to reach a 
parent corporation). 
 60. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) 
(applying standard of reasonableness); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (finding a 
charitable gift to be reasonable in the context of approving a settlement). 
 61. See, e.g., Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344–45 (Del. 1983) (affirming 
superior court’s reimbursement of reasonable expenses for proxy solicitation). 
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budget,62 historical artifact cannot, by itself, explain why the 
legislature has not taken a more active role. 
Second, even though fiduciary duty law has historically been 
judge-made, many other states have statutorily revised portions of 
fiduciary duty law.  For example, Indiana has a statute governing a 
board’s fiduciary duties in a takeover contest;63 Idaho’s statute defines 
“conflicting interest”;64  California’s statute defines “control”;65 Ohio’s 
statute revises the burden of proof in shareholder lawsuits;66 
Michigan’s statute defines a special class of independent directors and 
accords them special rights in derivative proceedings;67 over 30 states 
have passed statutes permitting a board to consider broader interests 
in discharging their fiduciary duties;68 and the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, adopted by over 20 states, codified the 
standards of conduct and liability for directors69 and the standards for 
commencement and dismissal of derivative suits.70  Delaware law, by 
contrast, contains no equivalent statutory provisions.  Thus, corporate 
law is judge-made in Delaware to a greater extent than in most other 
states. 
Third, the Delaware judiciary has taken the lead in expanding 
the breadth of judge-made law beyond its traditional domain.  Judicial 
decisions in Delaware have thus created novel doctrines regulating 
actions by a board of directors that are taken for inequitable 
purposes71 or that are intended to interfere with shareholder 
franchise72 and have minted a new fiduciary duty of disclosure.73  
 
 62. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 240 (1985). 
 63. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 64. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-860(1) (2005). 
 65. CAL. CORP. CODE § 160 (West 2005). 
 66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.59(C)–(D) (West 2005). 
 67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1495 (West 2005). 
 68. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: 
Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1827, 
1828 tbl.3 (2002). 
 69. REV. MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (1999). The Comment notes that these rules 
“spell[] out a practical working definition of ‘conflicting interest’” and are designed to create 
“bright line specificity and predictability.” Id., subch. F, introductory cmt. For a discussion of the 
tortured history of this effort and its ultimate failure, see R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey 
IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 BUS. 
LAW. 35, 35 (2000). 
 70. REV. MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.40–7.46 (1999). 
 71. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (enjoining 
management from expediting the annual stockholders’ meeting to obstruct a proxy fight with 
dissident shareholders). 
 72. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131–32 (Del. 2003); Blasius Indus., Inc. 
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
  
1594 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1573 
While these new doctrines can all be justified as complementing 
traditional fiduciary duties, they nevertheless represent an extension 
of the historic breadth of these duties and have been rejected by other 
jurisdictions.74  At a minimum, these doctrines show the great comfort 
on the part of Delaware’s judiciary, and great tolerance on the part of 
its legislature, for having the courts expand the scope of judge-made 
law to address novel problems, rather than waiting for the legislature 
to act. 
Fourth, the Delaware Supreme Court has shown a certain 
degree of discomfort with, perhaps even hostility to, legislative 
intrusions into its domain.  There are numerous examples of this 
tendency. 
• Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”) explicitly provides that, in an appraisal proceeding, 
the fair value of shares is to be assessed “exclusive of any 
element of value arising from any accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger.”75  Yet, in Weinberger v. UOP, the 
Delaware Supreme Court read this “to be a very narrow 
exception to the appraisal process designed to eliminate use of 
pro forma data and projections of a speculative variety  . . .”76 
• Section 144(a)(1) and (2) of the DGCL provides that a self-
dealing transaction shall not be voidable solely for this reason 
if it is approved after full disclosure by “a majority of the 
disinterested directors” or “in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders.”77  Yet, in Marciano v. Nakash, the Delaware 
Supreme Court read this to require “approval by fully informed 
disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested 
stockholders under section 144(a)(2),” in order to insulate a 
self-dealing transaction from attack.78 
• Section 157(b) of the DGCL provides that “[i]n the absence of 
actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors 
as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options 
and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.”79  Yet, in 
numerous compensation cases, the Delaware Supreme Court 
 
 73. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 21, at 499–500. 
 74. See, e.g., Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 
1997) (declining to follow Blasius); Solfanelli v. Mainwaring, No. 91-6249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18883, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1992) (finding no duty of candor under Pennsylvania law). Most 
states have not had occasion to determine whether they will adopt these new doctrines. 
 75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2005). 
 76. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
 77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144(a)(1)–(2) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 78. 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(b) (2005). 
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reads this to permit review of grants of options (even to 
nondirectors) under a waste standard, not the statutorily 
decreed “actual fraud” standard.80 
• Section 251(c) of the DGCL was amended in 1998 to permit a 
merger agreement to expressly stipulate that it must “be 
submitted to the stockholders whether or not the board of 
directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its 
advisability that the agreement is no longer advisable and 
recommends that the stockholders reject it.”81  Yet, the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Omnicare v. NCS held that this 
very stipulation constituted a per se breach of fiduciary duty by 
the board when a “cohesive group of stockholders with majority 
voting power” concurrently agreed to vote in favor of the 
merger.82 
• Section 220 of the DGCL was amended in 2003 to afford a 
stockholder of a Delaware corporation the right to inspect the 
books and records of a subsidiary of the corporation as long as 
“the corporation could obtain such records through the ‘exercise 
of control’ over [the] subsidiary.”83  Yet earlier this year, the 
Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Weinstein Enterprises Inc. v. 
Orloff  that, even though J.W. May, Inc. was a subsidiary of 
Weinstein Enterprises and Weinstein Enterprises controlled its 
affairs, a shareholder of Weinstein Enterprises was not entitled 
by Section 220 to obtain any records of J.W. May that were not 
in Weinstein Enterprises’ actual possession.84 
 
Fifth, in Delaware, legislative overturning of judge-made 
corporate law is practically unheard of.85  In the modern era, there has 
 
 80. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan,  407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979): 
Section 157 was intended to protect directors’ business judgment in consideration 
inuring to the corporation in exchange for creating and issuing stock options . . .  [W]e 
do not read section 157 as intended to erect a legal barrier to any claim for relief as to 
an alleged gift or waste of corporate assets in the issuance of stock options where the 
claim asserted is one of absolute failure of consideration. 
See also Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (interpreting Section 157 to bar 
claims for waste unless there was no consideration or actual fraud). 
 81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2005). 
 82. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003). 
 83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(2)(b) (2005). 
 84. Weinstein Enterprises Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 511 (2005). 
 85. In other areas and other states, the legislature does act to overturn judge-made law. 
See, e.g., H.R. 309, 142d Gen. Assem., 2d. Sess. (Del. 2004), available at http://www.legis. 
state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?op
en (choose House Bill from Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number 
field; then click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court 
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been only one significant instance of such overturning, and this 
instance represents the classic exception that proves the rule.  In 
1985, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,86 greatly 
increased the risk that directors would be held liable for breaches of 
their duty of care.  The decision, described by leading commentators as 
“shocking”87 and “one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate 
law,”88 led to the enactment of Section 102(b)(7).  By permitting a 
company to opt out of personal liability for good-faith breaches of the 
duty of care, Section 102(b)(7) took the sting out of the Van Gorkom 
decision.  Numerous other states followed Delaware and  corporations, 
with wide shareholder support, quickly availed themselves of the 
opportunity to opt-out of personal liability.89  But for this egregious 
instance, we are not aware of any significant corporate law decision in 
Delaware that has been legislatively overruled.90  In comparison, in 
 
precedents on searches and seizures); H.R. 1, 140th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Del. 1999), available 
at http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main& 
Src=/lis/lis140.nsf/?open (click on All Legislation; then click on Search in Legislation and follow 
instructions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court precedents on 
statutes of limitations); H.R. 249, 140th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Del. 1999), available at 
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/
lis/lis140.nsf/?open (click on All Legislation; then click on Search in Legislation and follow 
instructions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court precedents on 
insurance law); Eric Robinson et al., State Takeover Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey 10, 20, 24, 
40, 42, 56 (1989) (unpublished survey, on file with author) (noting that Colorado, Georgia, 
Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia passed statutes overturning court decisions that 
had invalidated poison-pill plans). 
 86. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 87. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 254 (2003). 
 88. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. 
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985). 
 89. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160, 1165–68 (1990). 
 90. According to an analysis of the legislative history and contemporary comments by 
renowned Delaware practitioners, there have been 26 amendments to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law since 1967 (the year the present modern corporation statute was enacted) that 
have responded in some fashion to judicial decisions. See Memorandum from Amy Simmer, 
Summer Associate at Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnel, to Roberta Romano (Summer 2005) (on 
file with author). We would like to thank Morris, Nichols, and Roberta Romano for permission to 
cite this memorandum. Of these 26 amendments, 3 related to federal tax law, 6 codified a 
judicial decision or amended the law in a manner consistent with a judicial decision, and 11 
responded to a judicial suggestion to clarify the law, clarified ambiguities, or addressed issues 
raised but not decided in a judicial decision. None of these amendments can be characterized as a 
judicial reversal. 
 Of the remaining 6 amendments, 2 “reversed” chancery court decisions rendered, 
respectively, 19 and 22 years prior to the amendment, and 3  related to chancery court decisions 
interpreting a statute and amended the statute in a way inconsistent with the chancery court 
interpretation. We would characterize the former two amendments as legislative updates, rather 
than legislative reversals, since the case law at issue was rather dated at the time of the 
amendment and since the legislature would have acted more quickly had it been unhappy with 
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the comparatively narrow field of insider trading, at least five 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court or federal circuit courts 
have been overturned by Congress or the SEC.91 
 
the judicial decision at the time it was rendered. With respect to the latter three amendments, 
there is an inherent ambiguity concerning whether the legislature thought that the court had 
misinterpreted the statute or whether it thought that the court interpreted the statute correctly 
as drafted but realized that it should have drafted the statute differently. In any case, none of 
these amendments related to Delaware Supreme Court decisions, and the subject matter of the 
amendments was narrow: they related to whether the appraisal provision in Section 262(i) 
authorized an award of compound interest, whether members of a membership corporation enjoy 
rights to inspect books and records equivalent to shareholders in stock companies, and whether 
an annual meeting must be held even if written consents are obtained for the election of 
directors. Thus, we would not characterize the judicial decisions that were reversed as 
significant. The final amendment related to whether election inspectors may contact a broker or 
similar institution to clarify its voting intentions when the broker has submitted multiple 
proxies relating to more votes than shares registered in its name. In 1989, the chancery court 
held that such clarification was not permissible, relying on a supreme court decision from 1971 
that held “conflicting proxies, irreconcilable on their faces or from the books and records of the 
corporation, may not be reconciled by extrinsic evidence.” Concord Fin. Group v. Tri-State Motor 
Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 1989) (quoting Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., 273 
A.2d 264, 265 (Del. 1971)). In 1990, the legislature provided by statute that brokers and similar 
institutions may be consulted to reconcile overvotes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(d) (2005). This 
issue is important, and the legislature’s timing suggests that it was stimulated by the 1989 
decision. The 1989 decision was only rendered by the chancery court, however, and it appears 
that the chancery court felt itself bound by the 1971 supreme court decision on point, which had 
not been legislatively addressed for over 20 years. 
 91. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that there 
is no private right of action where violation is premised on misappropriation theory), superceded 
by statute, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2005) (establishing a 
private right of action based on contemporaneous trading); Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 
704 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that insider owes no duty to abstain from trading to 
holder of options), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 
78t(d) (2005) (extending insider trading prohibition to derivatives where trading in underlying 
security is not permitted); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066–69 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(adopting “use” test), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b5-1 (2005) (establishing “awareness” test for insider trading); United States v. Chestman, 
903 F.2d 75, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding, under the particular facts, that family members of 
insiders owed no duty to family, corporation, or shareholders that obligated them to abstain from 
trading), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-
2(b)(3) (2005) (establishing presumptive duty of trust and confidence among family members); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–35 (1980) (holding that employee of printer 
working for bidder had no relation with target shareholders that obligated employee to abstain 
from trading), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 
(2005) (prohibiting trading based on information related to tender offer received directly or 
indirectly from bidder). One factor that is likely to contribute to the low rate of legislative 
reversals in Delaware is the greater expertise of the Delaware court (relative to the Delaware 
legislature and to federal courts) on issues of corporate law. But as we discuss below, the relative 
expertise of Delaware’s judiciary is itself an adaptation to the threat of federal preemption. See 
infra Parts II.D., II.E. 
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B. The Quasi-Deterministic Style of Delaware’s Judge-Made Law 
Beyond the breadth of judge-made law, the mode of judge-made 
law is noteworthy.  As several commentators have recently 
emphasized, judge-made Delaware law eschews hard rules in favor of 
flexible and highly fact-intensive standards.92  This results in an 
extraordinarily high degree of flexibility.  A typical Delaware opinion 
reads as if the specific facts, combined with long-standing and 
universally accepted fiduciary principles, clearly dictate the outcome 
of the case.  This permits Delaware law to respond to new problems or 
to revise the way it deals with old problems without openly admitting 
that the judges have made new law or have changed old law.93 
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court rarely overrules its own 
precedents explicitly.94  Instead, it tends to justify a ruling that is in 
tension with precedent (of which there have been a fair share) by 
explaining that general-sounding rules announced in earlier cases 
apply only to a much narrower set of circumstances95 or by attributing 
any misunderstanding by lawyers or lower court judges to their failure 
 
 92. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for 
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1233–40 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory 
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927–34 (1998); 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1009, 1024 (1997). 
 93. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 603–
04 (2002) (arguing that indeterminacy helps Delaware fend off federal intervention). Bebchuk 
and Hamdani view indeterminacy as helping Delaware hide the extent to which its law favors 
managers and the extent to which it changes the law to respond to the fear of federal 
intervention. Id. at 603. By contrast, we view indeterminacy as reinforcing the technocratic gloss 
of judge-made law. 
 94. A LexisNexis search in the Delaware Supreme Court database using the search term 
“overrule” has revealed no instance in the last 20 years in which the court overruled its own 
corporate law precedent. It did, however, reveal ten decisions in other areas in which the court 
overruled its own precedent. See, e.g., Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 382 
(Del. 1999) (overruling a 1994 decision regarding judicial review of administrative agencies). 
 95. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985) (noting that 
directors may consider “the impact [of a takeover bid] on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders 
[i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally]” in resisting a 
bid), with Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (faulting directors for 
taking into account the adverse impact of bid on noteholders, whose rights “were fixed by 
contract” and therefore “required no further protection,” and explaining that board may consider 
other constituencies only if “there are rationally related benefits accruing to stockholders”).  
Compare In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig. 634, A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993) (“In Delaware existing 
law and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty 
of disclosure.”), with Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 1997) 
(“Tri-Star stands only for the narrow proposition that, where directors have breached their 
disclosure duties in a corporate transaction that has in turn caused impairment to the economic 
or voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an award of nominal damages.”). 
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to read supreme court precedent carefully.96  Similarly, supreme court 
justices in Delaware rarely dissent.97 
Consistent with the presentation of Delaware law as a body of 
stable, clear, uncontroversial, and easy-to-follow standards laid down 
in a body of precedent, the court reacts harshly when directors’ actions 
fail to measure up.  In such instances, judicial opinions highlight these 
failures in preachy, moralistic terms.98  Deficiencies in the conduct of 
directors—whether because of ill-will, lack of backbone, or at the least 
incompetence—are presented as constituting a failure for which 
punishment is warranted (and not, say, to a reasonable, good-faith 
interpretation of what prior judicial decisions require), and directors 
are regularly pilloried for such failures by the Delaware Supreme 
Court.99 
C. The Making of Delaware’s Statutory Law 
Although formally adopted by the legislature, Delaware’s 
elected representatives have no significant role in crafting Delaware’s 
 
 96. Compare Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (noting that in a freezeout 
merger, the plaintiff’s “monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to . . . appraisal”), with 
Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985) (reversing the 
chancery court’s application of that principle and faulting it for adopting a “narrow 
interpretation of Weinberger [that] would render meaningless our extensive discussion of fair 
dealing found in that opinion”). Compare Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 
1989) (noting the chancery court held that the Time-Warner merger agreement did not result in 
change of control because control remained in fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders, but 
explicitly premising its holding on different ground, i.e., absence of a break), with Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (endorsing the rationale offered by 
the chancery court in Time and noting that defendants “misread” earlier cases and “totally 
ignore” portions of their language). See also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 
1116 (Del. 1994) (resolving conflict in chancery court as to effect of approval by special committee 
by noting that a “definitive answer” can be found in earlier supreme court opinions); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.34 (Del. 1988) (“Following Revlon, 
there appeared to be a degree of ‘scholarly’ debate about the particular fiduciary duty that had 
been breached in that case, i.e., the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. In [Ivanhoe Partners v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)], we made it abundantly clear that both 
duties were involved in Revlon, and that both had been breached.”) (emphasis added). 
 97. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 
127, 132 (1997) (noting the low rate of dissents, in absolute terms and compared to other states). 
 98. See Rock, supra note 92, at 1016 (describing the opinions of Delaware courts as 
“‘corporate law sermons’”). 
 99. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429–30 (Del. 1997) (noting that disinterested 
directors “abdicated their responsibility” and “default[ed] on their obligation to remain fully 
informed”); QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (stating that the directors of Paramount “remained prisoners of 
their own misconceptions”); Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280 (describing the board of Macmillan as 
“torpid, if not supine”); Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106 (noting that the special board committee of 
Hunt directors engaged in a “quick surrender” when faced with a squeeze-out offer by Hunt’s 
controlling shareholder); Rock, supra note 92, at 1028–60 (detailing other instances in which 
Delaware courts castigated actions by directors). 
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statutory corporate law.  It is the Council of the Corporation Law 
Section of the Delaware Bar Association, rather than a legislative 
committee,100 that prepares drafts of proposed amendments to the 
General Corporation Law.101  These proposals are often instigated by 
lawyers who have encountered an ambiguity or a technical problem in 
the statute that they want to have clarified or corrected.  After the 
Corporation Law Section has developed a proposal, it is submitted to 
the legislature.  Delaware’s legislature then typically adopts the 
proposed amendments.  Neither a legislative committee nor the 
legislature as a body changes the proposal or debates its merits, and 
the vote on the proposed amendment tends to be unanimous.102  
Legislators claim no expertise over corporate law, and partisan politics 
play no role in its formation.103 
Even within the Delaware bar, proposed amendments hardly 
ever generate controversy.104  One reason is that the Corporation Law 
Section endeavors to make the necessary compromises to reach a 
 
 100. The Delaware Senate has twenty-six committees; the House has twenty-eight 
committees. Official Website of the State of Delaware, http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature. 
nsf/?Opendatabase (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 101. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 898 (1990). 
 102. This is not the uniform mode for legislation in Delaware. In other areas, bills are 
amended in the legislative process, pass with dissent, or are defeated. See, e.g., H.R. 15, 142d 
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE. 
NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose House Bill from 
Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then click Go! button) 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (showing several proposed amendments to the bill on smoking 
regulation and noting its eventual defeat in the Senate); H.R. 24, 142d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. 
(Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?open 
frameset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose House Bill from Bill Type drop-down 
menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17, 
2005) (noting the Senate defeat of a bill clarifying crime of offering false instrument for filing); 
H.R. 182, 142d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/ 
LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose 
House Bill from Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then 
click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (showing a divided committee report on and several 
amendments to a bill on health care negligence suits). That Delaware’s Constitution requires a 
two-thirds majority for changes in the corporate law does not account for the lack of dissent or 
defeat, since supermajority requirements make it easier to defeat a bill and thus create 
incentives to dissent. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 Nor is this the uniform mode for corporate law legislation in states other than Delaware. See 
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 732 (describing the significant political controversy over the 
section of New York law imposing personal liability on large shareholders for wage claims); 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Michigan Senate Approves Change in Takeover Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2003, at C4 (noting that a bill protecting the Taubman family’s right to block a takeover of its 
shopping mall company by Simon Property Group was passed 24–14 after an amendment to the 
bill that would have enabled the bidder to continue its takeover effort was defeated 19–19). 
 103. Alva, supra note 101, at 898. 
 104. See id. at 909–13 (using the involuntary redemption statute as a case study). 
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consensus.  For example, a significant amount of bargaining took place 
within the Council over the precise scope of Section 102(b)(7) in order 
to generate an unanimous proposal for the legislature to act upon.105 
The ultimate reason for the lack of controversy over statutory 
amendments, however, is that, although Delaware regularly revises 
its corporate law, most amendments address minor or technical issues.  
Consider, for example, the 1999 amendments to the DGCL, which 
made changes to ten sections.106  Six of the changes concern only 
nonstock corporations107 or deal with the conversion of a corporation 
into a domestic LLC, a limited partnership, or a business trust (with 
unanimous shareholder approval), and vice versa.108  The remaining 
four amendments address the following: 
• Section 102(a) (name of corporations) was changed to provide 
that punctuation in terms such as “Ltd.” is optional and that 
foreign terms designating corporate existence are acceptable as 
part of the name. 
• Section 202 (transfer restrictions) was changed to clarify that 
restrictions may be placed on the amount of stock owned by 
any person, that a restriction may obligate a holder to sell 
restricted securities or provide for an automatic sale, and that 
restrictions imposed to qualify as a REIT are presumed to be 
reasonable. 
• Section 251(g) (mergers with wholly-owned subsidiaries to 
create a holding company) was changed to clarify that the 
directors of the surviving company may be changed without 
vote by the shareholders of the holding company. 
• Section 253 (short-form merger) was changed to clarify that the 
90 percent ownership prerequisite for short-form mergers 
applies only to classes of outstanding shares that would, but for 
that section, be entitled to vote on the merger. 
 
Thus, none of the 1999 amendments relate to corporate 
governance, fiduciary duties, or other core issues of corporate law, and 
 
 105. Id. at 914–15. 
 106. Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 123 (Del. Adv. Legis. Serv., LEXIS through Sept. 6, 2005). 
 107. Section 170 (dividends) was changed to clarify that nonstock corporations can declare 
dividends whether they are for profit or not for profit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2005).  
Section 242 (charter amendment) was modified to eliminate the requirement of two meetings by 
the governing body of a nonstock corporation to adopt a charter amendment. Id. § 242(b)(3). 
Section 255 (merger of nonstock corporations) lowers the approval threshold from two-thirds to a 
majority of members, thus conforming to the threshold for stock corporations. Id. § 255(c). 
 108. A new section, 266, permits a conversion by a corporation; another new section, 265, 
permits a conversion into a corporation; and amendments to Section 391 provide for fees for 
these conversions. Id. §§ 266, 265, 391(a)(25)–(26). 
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none could even remotely be anticipated to generate public debate or 
controversy.  Although statutory amendments occasionally venture 
somewhat further afield from the technical,109 the 1999 amendments 
typify Delaware’s legislative changes to its corporation law.110 
D.   Distinctive Features of Delaware’s Judiciary 
Delaware’s judiciary—the generator and, as discussed below, 
the primary enforcer of this distinctive law—is itself peculiar in 
several respects.  First, as noted above, Delaware is the only state that 
has a specialized corporate trial court, the Court of Chancery, which 
decides cases without juries.111  Usually, several of the five supreme 
court justices (at present, three) are former members of the chancery 
court.  Thus, both on the trial and the appeals court level, corporate 
cases are decided by a specialized judiciary. 
 
 109. For example, in a 1998 amendment, Section 251(c) was changed so that the merger 
agreement could “require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or not 
the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the 
agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.” Act of June 
29, 1998, ch. 339, § 44 (Del. Adv. Legis. Serv. LEXIS through Sept. 6, 2005) (codified at DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2005)). Of course, under federal law and Delaware fiduciary duty law, 
the directors would have to inform shareholders of their revised views and of the basis for these 
views. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that directors violate their fiduciary 
duties by including such a requirement in the merger agreement when shareholders lack the 
effective ability to block the merger in the shareholder vote. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003). This holding greatly limits the practical 
significance of the amendment with regard to merger agreements that lose board support but 
retain shareholder support. 
 110. By contrast, laws in other states address more substantive issues. For example, in 1999, 
several states amended substantive provisions of their corporation laws. Maryland enacted the 
Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act, ch. 300, 1999 Md. Laws 300 (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 3-801–3-805 (2005)), which includes several potent anti-takeover 
defenses, including the endorsement of a slow-hand pill, the application of the business judgment 
rule to takeover defenses, and the power of a board to adopt a staggered board without 
shareholder approval. See Subramanian, supra note 68, at 1864–66. Georgia amended its 
corporate law to sanction dead-hand pills. See Xueqing Linda Ji, A New Look at Dead-Hand 
Provisions In Poison Pills: Are They Per Se Invalid After Toll Brothers and Quickturn?, 44 ST. 
LOUIS L.J. 223, 263 (2000). Georgia also amended its business combination statute to provide 
that one does not become an interested shareholder as a result of shares tendered in a tender 
offer (until the shares are accepted) or as a result of a proxy solicited in a proxy solicitation to ten 
or more persons. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1110(4)(c) (2005). The Model Business Corporation Act 
was amended to eliminate appraisal rights for charter amendments, provide a market out, and 
change the standard for shareholder approval of asset sales from “substantially all” to a more 
concrete test. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 12.02(a), 13.02(a) (2005). Obviously, these examples are 
just illustrative and do not prove that substantive amendments to corporate codes are less 
common in Delaware than in other states. 
 111. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 708. 
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Second, compared both to judges in other states and to federal 
judges, Delaware’s judiciary is nonpoliticized.112  Delaware is one of 
only eight states in which judges are selected based on merit by a 
nominating commission and face no elections thereafter.113  In 
addition, Delaware’s constitution mandates a partisan balance in the 
supreme court and the overall judiciary.114 
To be sure, unlike federal judges, Delaware judges serve a 
limited term.115  But just as with initial appointment decisions, 
reappointment decisions are nonpoliticized. In modern times, there 
has only been one judge, Justice Andrew Moore, who wanted to get 
reappointed, but failed. The reason for this failure, however, is 
unrelated to his politics or his jurisprudence.  Rather, Justice Moore, 
while praised for his intellectual prowess, is said to have lost favor 
among the corporate bar because he was perceived as “arrogant, 
acerbic, sanctimonious and upbraiding.”116 
Finally, to a greater extent than is typical for members of the 
judiciary, Delaware judges propagate their vision outside the court 
room.  Delaware judges publish an extraordinary amount of extra-
judicial writing.117  Members of Delaware’s judiciary also regularly 
 
 112. See also Skeel, supra note 97, at 134 (describing the judicial appointment process as 
apolitical because it “is largely divorced from party politics in practice”). 
 113. THE LAWYER’S ALMANAC J-5–J-12 (2005). 
 114. DEL. CONST. art IV, § 3. 
 115. LAWYER’S ALMANAC, supra note 113, at J-5–J-12. 
 116. Karen Donovan, Shareholders’ Advocates Protest Justice’s Removal, NATL. L.J., June 6, 
1994, at B1, B2; see also John Close & Nicholas Varchaver, Justice Denied in Delaware, AM. 
LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at 23, 23 (noting that Justice Moore, “the author of a string of seminal 
opinions,” was prone to hand out “‘harsh chastisement of attorneys,’” “‘projected a sense of 
arrogance,’” and engaged in “‘ad hominem’” questioning during oral argument). 
 117. The following is an incomplete list of such writings by current (and very recently 
retired) members of the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery: William T. Allen, Jack 
B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation On Bridging the 
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: 
A Critique of  Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
449 (2002); William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and 
Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (1999); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections 
of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); Randy J. Holland, State 
Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989 (1996); Randy J. Holland, State Jury 
Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common Law Concepts, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 373 
(2004); Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with Accountability, 
5 WIDENER. L. SYMP. J. 117 (2000); Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases 
Without Controversy, 5 DEL. L. REV. 115 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law 
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response 
to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
1257 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of 
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of 
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participate in professional meetings, attend academic conferences, and 
give lectures to corporate directors.118  For example, Delaware judges 
regularly appear at the annual Tulane Corporate Law Institute: at the 
2004 conference, Justices Veasey, Steele, and Jacobs from the 
Delaware Supreme Court and Vice-Chancellor Strine from the 
Chancery Court were all present.119 
E.   The Reliance on Private Enforcement 
Another notable trait of Delaware’s corporate law is that it is 
enforced exclusively through private lawsuits.  Delaware has no 
regulatory agency that either examines compliance with corporate law 
or enforces its corporate law through fines, injunctions, or cease-and-
desist orders; the state does not enforce corporate norms through 
criminal proceedings; and even though the Attorney General has some 
civil enforcement powers with respect to for-profit corporations,120 
these powers are virtually never exercised.121 
 
Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” 
There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002); E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in a 
Post Enron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, The 
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation in Responding to 
Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or Agents, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2002); E. Norman 
Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 1 DEL. L. REV. 
169 (1998); E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Issues of 
Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2002); E. Norman 
Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2002); E. Norman Veasey, The Many Facets of Judicial Independence Diamond, 20 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 779 (2001); E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance 
Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate 
Governance Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key 
Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger 
and Acquisition Litigation, Speech Presented at the Fourth Annual Mergers and Acquisitions 
Insight Information Co. (June 18, 2001), in 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2001); E. Norman Veasey, 
Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice 
Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (2001); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate 
Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441 (2003). 
 118. Interestingly, while the Delaware Court of Chancery does not keep track systematically 
of chancellors’ speeches or public appearances, the SEC provides a website with links to speeches 
and public statements of commissioners and staff. See U.S. SEC, Commission Speeches and 
Public Statements, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2005). 
 119. Indeed, the brochure’s promised benefits include the opportunity to “learn from and 
interact with members of the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery.” Brochure, 
Tulane University Law School Sixteenth Annual Corporate Law Institute, March 2004 (on file 
with author). 
 120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 124(3), 284(a) (2005). 
 121. A search in Westlaw’s Delaware Business Organization Case Law file revealed three 
cases involving charitable corporations in which the Attorney General took some action. 
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In striking contrast to this lack of public enforcement, 
Delaware has taken great care in developing a first-rate system for 
private enforcement.  It is the only state in the nation that has a 
specialized corporate court, the Court of Chancery.  This court is well-
funded, enjoys wide respect, resolves disputes speedily, and probably 
accounts for the fact that Delaware’s overall court system is ranked 
first among all states.122  If needed, appeals from the Court of 
Chancery are heard by the Delaware Supreme Court quickly and 
decided promptly after oral argument.123  Moreover, Delaware takes 
pains to ensure that the chancery court has the personal jurisdiction 
that it needs in order to resolve corporate disputes involving Delaware 
corporations.  Thus, when the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated the statutory basis for Delaware’s personal jurisdiction as 
inconsistent with due process,124 thereby threatening the ability of the 
chancery court to resolve corporate disputes, Delaware passed a new 
statute within 13 days establishing a different statutory basis for its 
jurisdiction over corporate directors.125  More recently, in light of the 
trend by public corporations to have only a few officers serve on the 
board of directors, Delaware expanded its personal jurisdiction statute 
to include a corporation’s senior or most highly compensated officers, 
whether or not they are members of the board of directors.126 
This focus on private enforcement is distinctive both from the 
international and the national perspective.  Internationally, corporate 
law rules are to a large extent publicly enforced.  Public enforcement 
agents include the securities regulators of various countries; the Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers, which enforces the U.K. City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers; and prosecutors, who, in Continental Europe, 
bring criminal proceedings against misbehavior by corporate 
executives (including actions that would be regarded in the United 
States as, at most, civil breaches of fiduciary duties).127  Within the 
 
Otherwise, the Attorney General appeared in corporate disputes only as a defendant in cases 
challenging the constitutionality of Delaware’s anti-takeover law. 
 122. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 708 n.95. 
 123. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (1993) (providing the 
court’s order resolving dispute, which is dated same day as the oral argument). 
 124. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977) (holding that Delaware’s quasi-in-rem 
statute was not a valid basis for its exercise of jurisdiction over directors and officers of Delaware 
corporations). 
 125. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 714 n.117 (deeming directors to have consented 
to jurisdiction). 
 126. Frederick H. Alexander, Significant Amendments Made to Delaware Corporation Law, 
35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1331, 1333 (Aug. 11, 2003). 
 127. For example, several sections of the German Aktienrecht and U.K. company law impose 
criminal penalties and fines for misconduct. See, e.g., Aktiengesetz [AktG, Stock Corporation Act] 
§§ 399 (false statements) and 404 (violation of duty of confidentiality); Companies Act 1985, c. 6, 
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United States, corporate law rules adopted through the federal 
securities laws are enforced publicly, either on an exclusive basis or 
concurrent with private enforcement.128  Similarly, stock exchanges, to 
the extent that they enforce listing requirements designed to protect 
shareholders, can be regarded as quasi-public third-party enforcement 
agents.  Finally, a plethora of publicly-enforced state and federal 
laws—such as the Trust Indenture Act,129 the Investment Company 
Act,130 the Investment Advisers Act,131 and state Blue Sky laws132—
protect investors against overreaching by bond issuers, managers of 
mutual funds, brokers, and issuers of securities. 
To be sure, other states are not necessarily more active than 
Delaware is in enforcing corporate laws publicly.  But none of the 
other states has any significant stake in its corporate law, and none of 
the other states has developed sophisticated structures for the private 
enforcement of its corporate laws comparable to Delaware’s.133  
Moreover, some states publicly prosecute corporate misconduct, albeit 
under the guise of their criminal, rather than their corporate, law.  
Recently, for example, the Manhattan District Attorney charged 
Dennis Kozlowski, the CEO, and two other officers of Tyco 
International with grand larceny and violations of the general 
business law for looting the company through excessive compensation 
 
pt. X, § 342 (Eng.) (criminalizing the extension of loans to directors in violation of Company Act). 
For a particularly high-profile and dramatic example, see the current criminal prosecution of 
Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, over his approval as a director of Mannesmann of a 
bonus to Mannesmann’s CEO at the conclusion of the control battle with Vodafone. See, e.g., 
Mark Landler, Banker Faces German Court Over Pay Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at C1; 
Marcus Walker, After Huge Merger, German CEO Faces Trial Over Payout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 
2003, at A1; see also Santander Chairman Ordered to Stand Trial, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28. 2004, at 
C2 (reporting that three executives of a Spanish bank were being tried for arranging generous 
severance packages for some of the bank’s former executives). 
 128. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2005) (empowering 
SEC to investigate violations of and enforce provisions of Securities Exchange Act); Pitt Cites 
Record Number of Financial Reporting Actions, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 1747 (Oct. 28, 2002) 
(noting that SEC brought 163 actions for financial reporting and issuer disclosure violations in 
fiscal year 2002). 
 129. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77aaa–77bbbb (2005)). 
 130. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2005)). 
 131. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2005)). 
 132. E.g., Uniform Securities Act (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2005) (listing states 
that have already adopted the Act). 
 133. No state has a corporate court similar to Delaware’s chancery court. See Kahan & 
Kamar, supra note 38, at 708–15 (discussing other states’ less successful efforts to establish 
business courts). Only twelve other states have consent statutes relating to directors that are 
similar to Delaware’s and, to our knowledge, no other state has a consent statute relating to 
officers. See id. at 714 n.113. 
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or taking unauthorized loans—classic self-dealing transactions by a 
corporate fiduciary.134  And, with a federal investigation pending, 
Oklahoma’s Attorney General filed criminal charges against former 
WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers and five others for defrauding the 
state’s pension funds and other investors.135  Delaware, the domicile of 
choice for public firms, can and did extend its criminal jurisdiction to 
similar misconduct harming Delaware corporations136—yet we are not 
aware of any instances in which Delaware prosecutors have 
investigated or charged corporate officials.  Thus, even relative to 
other states, Delaware’s focus on private enforcement stands out. 
F.   The Scope of Corporate Law 
The scope of Delaware’s corporate law includes the regulation 
of the internal affairs of the corporation and concerns the powers, 
rights, and duties of the corporation, its shareholders, officers, and 
directors. Delaware’s corporate law, however, largely does not address 
matters beyond the internal affairs of the corporation. Although the 
scope of Delaware’s law in this respect is similar to the scope of 
corporate law in other states in the United States, it differs from the 
scope of corporate law in other countries.  U.K. company law, for 
example, prohibits carrying out a business under a misleading 
name,137 imposes a duty on a corporation to identify its name and 
characteristics in dealing with outsiders,138 regulates debentures,139 
and deals with security interests.140  In the United States, these issues 
are addressed by different bodies of state or federal law.141 
Within the confines of internal affairs, Delaware corporate law 
broadly covers most areas: the creation and dissolution of a 
corporation; the powers of a corporation; the decisionmaking powers of 
shareholders, directors, and officers; shareholder voting; and the 
 
 134. News Release, District Attorney-New York County, supra note 4. 
 135. Oklahoma Files First Criminal Charges Against WorldCom, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 
23, 2003, at 19; see also Former Qwest Chairman Anschutz to Pay $4.4M in N.Y. State Spinning 
Case, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 857 (May 19, 2003) (noting settlement by corporate executive 
of charges brought by N.Y. Attorney General that he received profitable allocations of IPO shares 
from Salomon Smith Barney “as an inducement or reward for investment banking business” 
from the company). 
 136. Delaware criminal law applies to offenses where the result occurs in Delaware or to 
conspiracies where at least one overt act occurs within Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 
204(a)(1)–(2) (2005). 
 137. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, pt. I, c. II, § 33 (Eng.). 
 138. Id. pt. XI, c. I, §§ 348–351. 
 139. Id. pt. V, c. VIII, §§ 190–195. 
 140. Id. pt. XII, c. I, §§ 395–409. 
 141. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-101 et seq. (2005) (dealing with secured transactions). 
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obligations of corporate fiduciaries.142  In general terms, Delaware 
corporate law (though not necessarily the laws of other U.S. states) 
also covers much of the same territory as the federal securities laws, 
though it does so in a rather different manner.  Federal law, for 
example, requires public companies to disclose a wide array of 
information, on a regular basis or in relation to a vote.143  Delaware 
law also governs the company’s disclosure of information.  But rather 
than imposing specific disclosure requirements, Delaware law 
requires a company to disclose all material information when 
shareholders are asked to vote or to take other actions144 and grants 
shareholders a general right to inspect the company’s books and 
records for a proper purpose.145  Federal law, including stock exchange 
rules sanctioned by the SEC, requires the board of directors of public 
corporations, including certain committees, to contain specified 
percentages of independent directors.  Delaware law also governs 
board composition.  But rather than the stick of mandated 
requirements, Delaware law uses the carrot of granting greater legal 
protections to properly constituted boards.146  Federal law prohibits 
certain forms of coercion and discrimination in tender offers.147  
Delaware law subjects coercion and discrimination by the corporation 
to legal scrutiny for breach of fiduciary duty and permits a board wide 
latitude in defending itself against a coercive offer by a third party.148  
Federal law criminalizes insider trading and creates a private right of 
action on behalf of investors.149 Delaware law creates a right of action 
on the part of the company, enforceable through a derivative suit by 
shareholders.150 
 
 142. See, e.g., notes 48–62, supra, and accompanying text. 
 143. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 982–83 (1992). Federal disclosure rules also apply to a company that seeks to 
issue shares. Id. at 983 & n.22. Delaware has no equivalent rules, presumably due to the fact 
that a sale of shares is outside the internal affairs of a company. 
 144. See Erickson  v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular LLC, No. 19974, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
38, at *13–*16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2003) (holding that the disclosure statement in a short-form 
merger did not comply with requirement to disclose all material information related to the 
merger to permit shareholders to make an informed decision on whether to exercise their 
appraisal rights). 
 145. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (2005). 
 146. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994). 
 147. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2005). 
 148. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957–58 (Del. 1985). 
 149. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1980); but see Securities Exchange 
Act, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005) (providing statutory insider trading provisions that enable 
private, derivative-suit-like enforcement mechanism). 
 150. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (1949) (“When . . . a person ‘in a confidential 
or fiduciary position, in breach of his duty, uses his knowledge to make a profit for himself, he is 
accountable for such profit’”) (citation omitted); Guttman v. Huang, 828 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 
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These differences in approach between Delaware and federal 
law, of course, are related to the distinctive traits of Delaware law.  As 
noted before, much of Delaware law is judge-made and privately 
enforced.  But the development of specific disclosure requirements, of 
mandated rules of board composition, of criminal violations, and even 
of inflexible per se rules on coercion and discrimination is hard to 
mesh with traditional modes of judge-made law, and specifically with 
the modes of privately enforced, judge-made corporate law in 
Delaware.  Because of the distinctive traits of Delaware law, its 
regulation of disclosure, board composition, coercive tender offers, and 
insider trading, though striking in the same direction, takes a form 
different from federal law. 
III. DELAWARE’S TRAITS AS ADAPTATIONS TO THE POLITICAL 
LANDSCAPE 
The various traits of Delaware corporate law discussed in the 
last Part should all be viewed through the lens of the institutional and 
political landscape in which Delaware must operate.  Delaware 
operates in a federal system in which its regulatory powers co-exist 
with and can be constrained by the powers of the federal government 
and the various other states.  In this system, Delaware is faced with 
an omnipresent, albeit not imminent, specter of a federal takeover.  
Such a takeover could make Delaware corporate law irrelevant, or at 
least greatly diminish the price companies are willing to pay to 
incorporate in Delaware, and thus eradicate the huge profits Delaware 
derives from being the domicile of choice for publicly-traded U.S. 
corporations.  Indeed, given the historic failure of states to take 
significant measures to compete with Delaware for incorporations,151 
the possibility of federal preemption of state corporate law due to 
populist pressure probably constitutes the single most important 
 
2003) (citing to Brophy for the proposition that “Delaware law has long held . . . that directors 
who misuse corporate information to profit at the expense of innocent buyers of their stock 
should disgorge their profit.”). As of late, Delaware seems to have become an easier venue for 
plaintiffs to pursue insider trading clams than the federal courts. See In re Oracle Corp. 
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921, 923 (Del. Ch. 2003) (refusing to dismiss derivative insider 
trading claim upon recommendation of special litigation committee even where similar direct 
claims under federal law have been dismissed for failure to meet the federal pleading 
requirements). 
 151. See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 684, 701–24 (supporting empirically 
the claim that “[o]ther than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract 
incorporation of public companies”). 
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threat to Delaware’s profits from the franchising business.152  
Moreover, embedded in this federal system are rules on personal 
jurisdiction and on conflict of laws which constrain Delaware’s ability 
to regulate certain types of corporate conduct effectively.  In this Part, 
we explain the traits of Delaware corporate law as modes of 
adaptation to this landscape. 
A.   Embracing Common Law Classicism: The Creative Use of 
Anachronism? 
There is something determinedly old-fashioned about Delaware 
corporate law.  The most superficial feature is the pomp and 
ceremony, the celebration of old distinctions such as that between law 
and equity, the attention to tradition.153  But it goes much deeper.  
Delaware corporate law may be the last vestige of the 19th century 
common law style in America. 
The traits of Delaware corporate law described above are 
striking in part because they represent a rather pure, and therefore 
rather unfamiliar, form of the common law system.  It is worth 
pausing for a moment to appreciate just how much of a throwback 
Delaware is.  The relationship between the Delaware judiciary and 
legislature exemplifies the traditional relationship between a common 
law judiciary and the legislature, and illustrates one of the traditional 
differences between a common law jurisdiction and a code jurisdiction.  
The dominance of the judiciary in making law, and the judiciary’s 
stubborn insistence on its primacy in relation to legislation, was 
already described, explored, and ultimately decried by Roscoe Pound 
in his classic 1908 article Common Law & Legislation.154  Pound 
famously attacked the attitude that lay behind the 19th century 
American common law judicial precept that “statutes in derogation of 
the common law shall be narrowly construed.”155  Similarly, in 
thinking about Delaware through Hart and Sacks’s conceptual 
framework, one is struck by the extent to which Delaware corporate 
 
 152. See Roe, supra note 6, at 600 (noting that Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes 
not from other states, but from the federal government); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at 
558 (same). 
 153. See, e.g., Delaware State Courts, Overview of the Delaware State Court System at 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (describing the Court of Chancery 
as having “jurisdiction to hear all matters relating to equity”). See also DELAWARE SUPREME 
COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951–2001 (Randy Holland & Helen Winslow eds., 2001) (tracing 
the history of Delaware courts since before 1776 and discussing their precedents in a variety of 
legal areas). 
 154. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). 
 155. Id. 
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law reflects a pre–New Deal understanding: no administrative 
agencies, private enforcement, and incremental legislation from an 
otherwise largely passive legislature.  And although never explicitly 
stated, the precept that “statutes in derogation of judge-made law 
shall be narrowly construed” offers a good guide to Delaware’s 
corporate law jurisprudence.156 
And yet we (including the Delaware judges and lawyers) are all 
moderns.  We all know that we live in the post-New Deal 
administrative state.  We have all learned the lessons that the Legal 
Realist taught157 and that Critical Legal Studies reemphasized:158 that 
law has an unavoidable political and moral aspect; that legal answers 
are created, not discovered; that the law’s affectation of technocratic 
expertise and neutrality is often a cover for political and normative 
choices.  We therefore cannot assume that Delaware’s embrace of the 
19th century style is simply a naive (mis)understanding of the nature 
of law. 
What, then, could be behind this seemingly disingenuous 
affectation?  We argue that this old common law vision, with its 
distinctive judicial virtues, is adaptive given Delaware’s vulnerable 
position in the corporate lawmaking hierarchy.  Just as the old 
common law style has been explained as a way that politically weak 
judges preserve their autonomy (or, less charitably, grab political 
power), so too that style can serve to aid a politically weak state in 
preserving its lawmaking autonomy within a larger political 
landscape. By aligning itself with this history, Delaware gains 
legitimacy. 
B.   Preserving the Technocratic and Apolitical Gloss 
Several of the traits described above have the effect of creating 
and enhancing a technocratic, apolitical gloss on Delaware law.  The 
public perception of Delaware’s corporate law as largely technocratic 
and apolitical is important for Delaware as it helps fend off federal 
intervention.  As explained in Part I, Delaware has a legitimacy 
problem: why should a little state make the national rules of corporate 
law?  By constructing its law as technocratic and apolitical, Delaware 
 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
 157. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32–41 (1935) (acknowledging 
that judges “make and change the law” and attributing the contrary view—law as definitive 
rules—to a “[c]hildish dread of uncertainty”). 
 158. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685, 1707–10, 1751–62 (1976) (explaining the necessity of judicial value judgments, 
even when courts claim merely to be applying rules). 
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deflects attention from the democratic deficit of its corporate law, 
legitimizes its role as promulgator of the de facto national corporate 
law, and reduces the likelihood of a populist challenge to its 
preeminence. 
Several traits of Delaware law contribute to this technocratic 
and apolitical gloss.  Consider first the breadth of judge-made 
corporate law. Judge-made law tends to have more of a neutral, 
apolitical aura than statutory law.159  Judges are more removed from 
the political process, and professional norms require judges to give 
reasoned opinions based on precedent, rather than simply doing what 
they think is the right thing politically.  In judicial reasoning in 
general, and Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence in particular, 
partisan conflicts are not openly discussed, monetary contributions 
are supposed to play no role, lobbying takes the form of technical legal 
briefs, and political choices are swept under the carpet. 
To the extent that corporate law rules are judge-made, the fact 
that it is Delaware judges rather than federal judges who make the 
rules does not much detract from the legitimacy of these rules.  Judges 
lack obvious democratic legitimacy in any event.  Rather, judicial 
decisions and judge-made law can be thought to derive legitimacy in 
the public eye160 from neutral, nonpartisan, and technical “legal” 
reasoning.  In other words, in the public perception, federal and 
Delaware judges are largely interchangeable, or at least much more so 
than federal and Delaware legislators would be.  Indeed, since 
Delaware’s judiciary is less politicized and has greater claims to 
expertise in corporate law than the federal judiciary, its rulings may 
enjoy greater legitimacy than would corporate rulings of federal 
judges. 
The style of Delaware’s judge-made law further enhances the 
notion that the law is technocratic and apolitical.  Delaware’s supreme 
court eschews overruling its own precedent and dissenting opinions.161  
Instead, Delaware Supreme Court opinions adopt a quasi-
deterministic reasoning according to which any disagreements with 
the Court of Chancery or corporate actors are due to faulty legal 
reasoning or moral shortcomings by others.  This serves to gloss over 
the fact that reasonable minds may differ on how an issue ought to be 
 
 159. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at 604 (noting that reliance on judge-made, 
rather than legislative, law reduces Delaware’s legitimacy problem). 
 160. Even though many modern legal scholars and practitioners are aware that judicial 
reasoning is often just a veneer that masks important and controversial decisions of a political 
nature, the relevant political sphere here is not legal scholars and practitioners, but the general 
public, which is much less aware or comfortable with judges making political choices. 
 161. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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resolved and that the outcome of disputes depends not just on the 
decisionmaker’s technical skills but on her policy preferences. 
The lack of public enforcement further reduces the state’s 
visible role in the administration of its corporate law.  Rather than 
two state bodies (one that brings actions and another that resolves 
disputes), only one body, the judiciary, is involved.  Delaware thus has 
no room for (over)eager, or overly lax, and possibly politically 
motivated law enforcers in the tradition of Eliot Spitzer,162 Rudy 
Giuliani,163 or Harvey Pitt.164  Delaware, of course, does have courts 
and judges.  But judges are brought to the fore through the 
decentralized activities of private actors rather than on their own 
motion; they lack the power and the staff to conduct investigations; 
and they are supposed to exercise restraint in commenting on 
disputes.  Delaware’s judiciary, in particular, is highly respected for 
its technocratic expertise and represents a model of nonpartisanship.  
The focus on enforcement of Delaware corporate law through actions 
initiated by private parties and resolved by Delaware courts thus 
supports the apolitical and technocratic image of the law. 
 
 162. See, e.g., Michael Slackman & Marc Santora, Spitzer, Sounding Gubernatorial, 
Discusses the State of the State, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at B8 (“Since his election as attorney 
general, Mr. Spitzer has worked quietly and efficiently to position himself for a run for governor, 
taking on issues—like Wall Street corruption—that have given him a national spotlight while 
also working to build grassroots support across the state.”). 
The recent wave of outrage about Wall Street’s behavior began, you may recall, when 
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer deployed an obscure state law to 
shoehorn out of Merrill Lynch every e-mail message Merrill employees had ever sent 
relating to the Internet boom.  It was easy to see why Spitzer chose Merrill Lynch as his 
target.  He has political ambitions (he wants to be governor of New York, at least), and 
unlike Goldman, Sachs or Morgan Stanley or one of the other big investment banks 
more central to the Internet bubble, Merrill actually serviced lots of small customers.  
It’s a firm that voters can relate to. 
Michael Lewis, In Defense of the Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002 (Magazine), at 44. 
 163. See, e.g., Catherine S. Manegold, A Road of Many Turns, an End Triumphant, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at B3: 
Campaigning for mayor, Mr. Giuliani always said his quest was a natural progression 
in a career that took him from the Federal prosecutor’s office in Manhattan to the No. 
3 official in the Reagan Justice Department and finally United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York. . . . 
. . . He became famous for his prosecution of organized crime figures and insider 
trading. The names Milken, Boesky and Drexel-Burnham Lambert were linked with 
his after he led a series of assaults against Wall Street’s excesses. 
 164. Harvey Pitt, who had been hailed on his appointment as chair of the SEC, was 
ultimately forced to resign in the wake of accusations of laxity in response to the corporate and 
accounting scandals. Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride of S.E.C. Chief, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at A1 (mentioning the unusual speed with which the SEC filed fraud 
charges against WorldCom). 
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The extra-cameral activities by members of the Delaware 
judiciary also mesh well with Delaware’s political interests.165  These 
activities help market Delaware law to the legal community; let judges 
obtain information about the views of practitioners and academics; 
and enable the judiciary to amplify its admonitions to directors to 
comport with the judiciary’s vision of proper corporate governance and 
thus beef up Delaware’s enforcement regime.  In all these respects, 
they make Delaware more attractive as an incorporation haven.  But, 
from our perspective, they also serve an additional function: they 
create an outlet for dissatisfaction with legal rulings and permit 
individual members of the judiciary to refine, confine, and maybe even 
signal a retreat from the court’s holdings.  The need for this outlet is 
created by the fact that members of Delaware’s judiciary cannot be 
directly lobbied; that practicing lawyers may be reluctant to criticize 
judicial rulings openly; and that the judiciary lacks control over its 
docket and thus may value the opportunity to clarify its holdings 
before the next case involving that issue arises. 
Even in the matters into which the legislature does intrude, 
Delaware law has—in this instance deservedly—a technocratic and 
apolitical appearance.  Proposed laws are adopted without amendment 
or debate by overwhelming majorities.  Any lobbying that takes place 
occurs within the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware bar.  Thus, 
even within the legislative process, the dirty portions of politics either 
do not exist or at least are not visible: campaign contributions, 
partisanship, and even the special interests of local constituents have 
no apparent effect on the law, and lobbying is channeled through a 
professional, consensus-oriented body that meets outside the public’s 
eye and self-consciously avoids taking on controversial issues. 
This is not to say that Delaware politics are generally more 
pure than elsewhere or that large in-state interests—be it large local 
corporations such as DuPont or MBNA, or chicken farmers from the 
southern part of the state—do not have significant influence in 
Delaware politics.  They do.  But precisely because local Delaware 
politics is impure, it is imperative for Delaware to ensure, as much as 
possible, that the corporate lawmaking process is not, or is perceived 
not to be, the product of ordinary politicking.  Few things would do 
more to undermine Delaware’s legitimacy than, say, a front-page 
article in a major newspaper discussing how a large corporation got 
 
 165. See supra note 117. 
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some controversial legislation passed by channeling substantial 
campaign contributions to local politicians.166 
C.   The Minimization of Interjurisdictional Conflict 
Another way that Delaware adapts to its position in the federal 
system is to take account of the rules on personal jurisdiction and 
conflict of laws to avoid interjurisdictional conflicts.  Under the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert 
jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite minimum 
contacts with the forum state.167  Under prevailing rules on conflict of 
laws, which are part of the law of each state, the law of the state of 
incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation, but other 
factors determine the law applicable to most other disputes.  These 
jurisdictional and conflict rules help explain the scope of Delaware’s 
corporate law. 
Consider, for a moment, how narrow Delaware’s corporate law 
is.  It is largely confined to the regulation of the internal affairs of the 
corporation.  This scope is due neither to some inherent understanding 
of what corporate law is about (for example, U.K. company law 
encompasses a number of other matters) nor to Delaware not being 
able to offer a superior substantive product on other matters—because 
of its quality courts and its responsiveness, it well could.  Rather, it is 
due to conflict of laws rules which would generally not point to the law 
of the state of incorporation as governing matters outside the internal 
affairs of the corporation. 
Of course, Delaware could revise its own conflict rules to point 
to Delaware law as governing matters outside the company’s internal 
affairs.  But Delaware could not force other states to do the same.  
Thus, depending on whether a dispute is litigated in Delaware or a 
different forum, the forum’s conflict rules would point to different 
bodies of law, with possibly different substantive content.  As a result, 
parties would not know which substantive rules apply before a lawsuit 
 
 166. See Sorkin, supra note 102 (noting that intense lobbying effort by the Taubman family 
led to the passage of legislation that would enable the family to block a hostile bid for its 
shopping mall empire); Editorial, Spitzer v. Grasso, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at A16 
(suggesting that Spitzer failed to sue fellow Democrat Carl McCall, past chairman of the New 
York Stock Exchange’s compensation committee during Grasso’s tenure, for political reasons). 
 167. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only 
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ . . . [The Due 
Process Clause] does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or 
relations.”) (citation omitted). 
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is brought.  Even if Delaware law were substantively superior to the 
law of other states, parties may well prefer to know with certainty 
that they are governed by the (inferior) law of, say, Maryland, to 
uncertainty over whether (inferior) Maryland law or (superior) 
Delaware law applies. 
Moreover, Delaware has a lot to lose from challenging the 
prevailing rules on conflict of laws.  If Delaware is perceived as being 
overly aggressive in expanding its own law to areas that are not 
traditionally subject to laws of the state of incorporation, other states 
may respond by changing their conflict rules to limit the scope of the 
internal affairs rule.  The continued applicability of the internal 
affairs rule is, of course, the life-blood of Delaware.  Thus, Delaware 
has no interest in pursuing a major change to the status quo of conflict 
rules. 
Furthermore, Delaware would only have a limited ability to 
enforce many rules that would fall outside the internal affairs 
doctrine.  To enforce its law effectively, Delaware courts need personal 
jurisdiction over the relevant defendants.  Such jurisdiction would be 
lacking, say, over a creditor who claims a security interest in the 
company’s property—an issue regulated by U.K. company law but not 
by Delaware corporation law.168 
Limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction may even affect 
how Delaware regulates internal affairs.  For example, Delaware law 
imposes no duties on shareholders (unless they are controlling 
shareholders)169 to disclose information or on a bidder to structure 
tender offers in a certain manner.170  Such rules may well complement 
 
 168. See supra Part II.F. 
 169. Though having control of a Delaware corporation is not a sufficient basis for personal 
jurisdiction, individual controlling shareholders will often be directors and corporate controlling 
shareholders will usually be under a duty to indemnify their representatives on the board of the 
controlled company, and thus be subject to the de jure or de facto jurisdiction of the Delaware 
courts. Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No. 17612, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *50–*55 
(Del. Ch. July 12, 2000) (rejecting the argument that the controlling shareholder was an 
indispensable party and exercising jurisdiction over individual directors who held a large stake 
in controlling shareholder, noting that directors could seek indemnification or contribution from 
the controlling shareholder in a separate action). Moreover, Delaware employs the far-reaching 
conspiracy theory to obtain personal jurisdiction over controlling shareholders. See, e.g., Parfi 
Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, 794 A.2d 1211, 1229–30 (Del. Ch. 2001) (basing 
jurisdiction on conspiracy theory, which requires that a controlling shareholder participated in a 
conspiracy and had reason to know that a substantial act or effect in furtherance of conspiracy 
occurred in the forum state); Gibralt Capital Corp. v. Smith, No. 17422, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 60, 
at *15–*20 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2001) (same). 
 170. Such duties do exist under U.S. federal law and U.K. company law. Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (2005); Company Act 1985, §§ 198–210A 
(Eng.). Curiously, Delaware’s corporation law has a “reorganization” section that permits 
companies to insert a clause in their charter that would permit a requisite majority of creditors 
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the governance structure established by Delaware’s corporate law.  
But because being a shareholder of or a bidder for shares of a 
Delaware corporation would not likely satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of minimum contacts, Delaware courts would lack the 
ability to enforce such duties effectively.  
IV.   IMPLICATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS 
A.   Responding to Crises 
Delaware corporate law’s adaptive adherence to the old 
common law model carries inherent limitations that can bind 
uncomfortably when crises arise.  In this regard, contrast the different 
responses to the post-Enron sense that “something must be done.”  
Congress held hearings and ultimately enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  The SEC, on its own accord and in response to congressional 
dictate, adopted new regulations and leaned on the stock exchanges to 
reform their corporate governance standards for listed companies.171  
Several states passed new laws or instituted criminal proceedings 
against executives involved in the scandals.172 
Compare this to Delaware.  Its legislature did not act—it did 
not hold any hearings and did not pass any legislation—because it 
eschews controversy.  No administrative agency promulgated new 
rules because Delaware has no parallel to the SEC.  No public 
prosecutor went on the warpath against corporate wrong-doers 
because Delaware corporate law is enforced by private actions.  Given 
Delaware’s traditional mode of addressing controversy, it had to wait 
until a legal dispute was brought in its courts.  Since no case was 
brought, Delaware had no opportunity to address the recent scandals 
directly.  In short, Delaware has been out of the limelight. 
This does not mean, however, that Delaware has been out of 
the loop.  It is much too early to tell what effect the recent scandals 
will have on Delaware law.  We will not know until, several years 
hence, we look back and trace out the various ways in which the 
 
(majority in number, three-quarters in value) to approve a compromise or arrangement that, if 
approved by the court, would be binding on all creditors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(2) (2005) 
(prescribing exact language).  It is unlikely that the Delaware courts have the jurisdiction over 
creditors to enforce this section and it does not appear that it is ever used. See RODMAN WARD, 
JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102.10 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 
2005) (citing no relevant cases in commentary on section). 
 171. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The SEC Takes 
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 93 (2005). 
 172. See supra notes 3 & 4. 
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lessons of Enron, etc.—whatever they turn out to be—are, 
incrementally and slowly, incorporated and expressed in Delaware 
judicial review of board conduct.173 
Some may lament that Delaware is slow to respond.174  But 
that is to miss a very important point: Delaware’s slowness is part and 
parcel of its adherence to a particular, traditional, reactive model of 
judge-centered lawmaking.  That adherence, as we have argued, is an 
adaptation to the federalist landscape in which it operates.  To deviate 
in response to some felt necessity would probably be wrong headed.  If 
Delaware were to try to out-reform Congress and the SEC, it would be 
bound to lose because of its inherent disadvantage in legitimating the 
provision of national law. 
Contrast, in this respect, Delaware’s passivity with the activity 
of Eliot Spitzer, who managed to sideline the SEC on several fronts.  
Spitzer is the Attorney General of one of the largest states, the 
geographic home of the major stock exchanges, of the major 
investment banks, and of numerous investors.  As such, Spitzer’s 
democratic legitimacy greatly exceeds Delaware’s.  But much more 
importantly, Spitzer, one suspects, is less concerned about preserving 
New York’s long-term regulatory power than about dealing with the 
current crisis and earning financial (for the state) and political (for 
himself) rewards for being visibly on the ball while the SEC was 
asleep.  Thus, even if, as is likely, the SEC ultimately reasserts its 
preeminence in regulating the securities industry and fends off future 
interference by state regulators,175 Spitzer will come out a winner.  By 
 
 173. We can already see some subtle signs that Delaware law will be changing. For example, 
in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942–48 (Del. Ch. 2003), Vice-Chancellor 
Strine employed a narrow concept of independence—one that takes into account the fact that 
interests that are not directly financial, such as collegiality among members of the same faculty 
or charitable donations to a faculty member’s university, can impinge on one’s independence—in 
refusing to dismiss a complaint upon the recommendation of a special litigation committee. And 
in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286–90 (Del. Ch. 2003), Chancellor 
Chandler refused to dismiss a complaint that a senior officer received an overly generous 
severance package on the grounds that the alleged lack of board involvement in structuring the 
severance package may amount to lack of good faith and board members may thus not be 
protected by Section 102(b)(7). In addition, the Delaware judiciary has been out on the hustings 
trying to send a message. See, e.g., Chandler & Strine, supra note 117, at 1005–06 (urging that 
courts “sensibly implement[]” the 2002 reforms and that states implement reforms of their own). 
 174. Others do not. See Romano, supra note 22, at 6–12, 215–16 (criticizing Congress for 
enacting harmful regulations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). We take no position on the merits of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or whether a different legislative response would have been preferable. 
 175. For efforts in that vein, see Judith Burns, SEC Warns of Uncoordinated Inquiries, 
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at C14 (noting a complaint by the SEC chairman that state officials 
act “for political gain and may compromise federal investigations in the process”); Tom 
Lauricella, et al., Morgan Stanley Case Illustrates States’ Strategy, WALL. ST. J., July 15, 2003, at 
C1 (noting the passage of a bill by the House Financial Services subcommittee that would 
weaken states’ ability to regulate the securities industry). 
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contrast, any move by Delaware that earns it short-term plaudits but 
undermines its long-term status as corporate domicile would make it a 
loser. 
B.   The Symbiotic Relationship Between Federal Law and Delaware 
Law 
Delaware’s adherence to a traditional common law model and 
the rules on jurisdiction and conflict of laws constrain its ability to 
regulate.  When rules are required (or thought to be required) that 
Delaware is unwilling (because it would be in tension with the 
common law model) or unable (because of jurisdictional and conflict 
rules) to supply, any such regulations would be left to a hodgepodge of 
state rules or, if a national solution is desirable, would have to be 
imposed by the federal government. 
One example of rules that would be difficult for Delaware to 
supply is the mandatory disclosure rules imposed by the federal 
securities laws.  Consider, first, the logistical requirements.  The 
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance alone has about 400 
employees,176 far more than the whole of the chancery and supreme 
courts of Delaware.  To be able to devise a similarly detailed 
regulatory regime, Delaware would thus have to change its 
lawmaking infrastructure radically.  It could no longer rely on a small 
body of judicial officers, but would instead have to establish a major 
regulatory agency with a number of employees and a budget closer to 
the SEC’s.177 
Doing so, however, would generate two problems.  First, it 
would bring to the fore issues of democratic legitimacy that Delaware 
would rather remain obscure.  In particular, the adoption and revision 
of regulations would entail more explicit lawmaking—and thus make 
controversial political and normative choices more manifest—than at 
present.  Second, adopting a comprehensive regulatory regime would 
be hampered by conflict rules and jurisdictional limitations.  Unlike 
conflict rules on the internal affairs of a corporation, conflict rules on 
disclosure regulations with respect to the issuance and trading of 
 
 176. During fiscal year 2003, there were 341 staff in the Corporate Finance division and 
another 92 in the related Office of Filing and Information Services. SEC, PROTECTING 
INVESTORS: ANNUAL REPORT 2003 61 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ 
ar03full.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 177. The SEC’s budget for fiscal year 2003 was approximately $717 million. Id. at 142.  
Delaware’s entire budget outlay for the Division of Corporations, the Court of Chancery, and the 
Supreme Court is about $10 million. State of Delaware, Office of the Budget Homepage, 
http://www.state.de.us/budget/default.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).   
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securities do not point to the law of the state of incorporation.178  In 
addition, Delaware lacks personal jurisdiction over various parties 
subject to the federal regime, such as broker/dealers, 5-percent 
shareholders, shareholders engaged in secondary offerings of 
securities, shareholders who solicit proxies, accounting firms, and 
employees engaged in insider trading.  Delaware courts would thus 
lack the ability to enforce the regulatory regime on these parties, 
which would likely diminish greatly the effectiveness of any 
regulatory structure. 
More generally, there are several types of rules that Delaware 
is unlikely to supply and for which federal regulation may (if the 
requisite rules are indeed efficient) be desirable.  The first type 
concerns issues where prevailing state conflict rules do not point to 
the state of incorporation.  These include, for example, fraud in 
connection with the sale of securities under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or the 
manipulation of security prices.179 
The second type concerns issues as to which individual states 
cannot constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the relevant 
defendants.180  Regulations under the Williams Act of bidders and 5-
percent shareholders, regulations of broker/dealers, disclosure 
requirements for large shareholders under Section 16 of the Exchange 
Act, and the prohibition against “insider” trading under the 
misappropriation theory are examples of rules that Delaware could 
not effectively enforce because its courts would lack the requisite 
personal jurisdiction over most defendants. 
The third type concerns issues where public enforcement is 
preferable to private enforcement.  This includes misconduct that is so 
severe that criminal penalties are warranted and problems best 
enforced through prophylactic rules by an administrative agency 
rather than by private litigation.  An example of the latter may be 
rules against selective disclosure of information like Regulation FD, 
violations of which may be publicly enforced but cannot form the basis 
of a private lawsuit.181 
The fourth type concerns issues for which a detailed rule-based 
ex ante regulatory regime is desirable.  An example may be the 
 
 178. See Romano, supra note 13, at 2402–12 (proposing change in the choice-of-law rules to 
operationalize proposed state competition over securities regulation). 
 179. On the latter, see the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2005) and 
regulations promulgated thereunder. 
 180. Note here the special broad rules on venue and jurisdiction in securities lawsuits. 
Securities Exchange Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2005). 
 181. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2005). 
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adoption of accounting rules guiding the manner in which a company 
must disclose financial information, other specific disclosure 
obligations, or specific rules exempting certain companies, securities, 
or transactions from certain obligations. 
The fifth type concerns issues that are so openly political that 
they cannot be effectively adopted through a common law judge-made 
system.  An example would be the institution of a codetermination 
regime, as it prevails in Germany, where employees have substantial 
representation on the board of directors.  A U.S. example might be the 
adoption of a provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that 
prohibits the payment of bribes without regard to their effect on the 
firm.182 
Finally, our analysis points to a sixth type of issue that 
Delaware, although it may be able to regulate as effectively as a 
federal lawmaker, would gladly yield to the feds.  These are issues 
that are both inherently difficult to regulate effectively and are 
particularly likely to trigger a populist response.  The prime example 
of such a “hot potato” issue is executive compensation, a topic 
regulated (ineffectively) by both federal and state law that regularly 
invites populist anger over the stellar income of (not always stellar 
performing) executives. 
Federal law’s primacy in any of these areas does not 
necessarily undermine Delaware’s position as national provider of 
corporate law.  To the contrary. If Delaware is not able to regulate 
certain conduct effectively, it is probably in its interest to have this 
conduct regulated on the federal level (or by other states) to fill the 
lacunae in its own law.  Without such federal regulation, continued 
and unsanctioned wrongdoing could result in a populist backlash 
against Delaware as the provider of an ineffective regulatory regime 
and lead to a wholesale replacement of Delaware law.  Federal 
regulation can thus strengthen Delaware’s long-term position in two 
ways.  First, by making the system as a whole less scandal-prone, 
federal regulation reduces the likelihood of a populist attack.  Second, 
to the extent that scandals nevertheless ensue, a federal regulatory 
system provides an alternative target—a lightening rod from 
Delaware’s perspective—for a populist attack.  Indeed, the federal 
regime—being more openly political, partisan, and publicly enforced—
may well make a more inviting target than Delaware.183 
 
 182. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2005). 
 183. In the recent scandals, for example, greater blame was given to the SEC than to 
Delaware. See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 164 (discussing the shortcomings in the administration 
of ousted SEC chairman Pitt). 
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Thus, while Delaware lives under the constant threat of federal 
preemption, there is as well a significant symbiotic element to the 
relationship between federal law and Delaware law.  Delaware 
benefits from federal regulation, as long as it is in the right areas and 
of the right sort. 
   CONCLUSION 
The recent corporate scandals, and the various reactions of the 
different regulatory actors, provide an opportunity to tease out some 
important features of our corporate law federalism.  In this Article, we 
have argued that Delaware corporate law, and Delaware’s reaction to 
corporate crises, must be analyzed from within the institutional and 
political landscape in which Delaware’s regulatory powers coexist 
with, and can be constrained by, the powers of the federal government 
and the various other states.  From this perspective, the 19th century 
common law style of Delaware corporate lawmaking can be 
understood as a creative use of anachronism, as an invocation of 
apolitical technocratic expertise as a way of making up for an arguable 
lack of democratic legitimacy.  At the same time, the scope of 
Delaware’s law is crafted in a way that minimizes conflicts with other 
jurisdictions.  Because of the constraints placed on Delaware by the 
federalist structure, the relationship between federal law and 
Delaware law can be best understand as symbiotic rather than merely 
competitive.  Although Delaware is threatened by federal preemption, 
it is also served by federal regulations that regulate areas which 
Delaware cannot regulate effectively.  Such regulations help ward-off 
crises and thus provide a lightening rod for a populist backlash that 
could produce severe harm to Delaware’s position as the creator of our 
de facto national corporate law. 
